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MICHAEL TETER*
The Constitution places the authority for confirming federal judicial
nominations with the US. Senate. For centuries this responsibility was
undertaken with a sense of duty and purpose. Today, it seems as though many
senators see the constitutional command that the Senate "advise and consent"
to judicial nominations as an opportunity to delay and obstruct in the name of
partisan, ideological, or electoral advantage. Indeed, this is the new norm of
the judicial confirmation process, resulting in a judicial vacancy crisis and a
fractured Senate. Past suggested reforms, however, do not go far enough. To
free the judicial confirmation process from the current destructive dynamics
requires significant changes. Drawing on past legislative efforts to address
institutional gridlock, the Article provides new insights into the judicial
confirmation problem, suggests dramatic reforms in the form of a
Confirmation Commission, and offers a historic, constitutional, and political
justfication for the proposal.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A nation of laws requires judges. A nation of judges requires Senate
action.1 Unfortunately, today, Senate action is exceedingly rare,2 resulting in a
depleted federal judiciary.3 Moreover, those judges who made it to the bench
likely were forced to endure months, if not years, of uncertainty as they awaited
Senate confirmation. 4 Their nominations were part of a larger partisan and
ideological battle-true pawns in a conflict that did not involve, but did
envelope, them. And for many other unsuccessful nominees, the only thing the
process confirmed was that change is needed.
1 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
2George Packer, The Empty Chamber: Just How Broken Is the Senate?, NEW
YORKER, Aug. 9,2010, at 38.3 See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Current Judicial Vacancies, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies/CurrentJudiciaVacancies
.aspx (last updated Feb. 1, 2012) (showing that approximately 10% of the federal judiciary is
vacant).
4 Sheldon Goldman, Assessing the Senate Judicial Confirmation Process: The Index of
Obstruction andDelay, 86 JUDICATURE 251, 253, 254 (2003).
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The "confirmation mess"'5 draws the attention of presidents, legislators,
scholars, and judges-including the two most recent Chief Justices. 6 The
problem includes delays, obstruction, a focus on concerns unrelated to the
nominee's qualifications, and a judicial vacancy rate that has left many circuit
courts in a perpetual state of crisis. Critiques of the judicial appointment process
almost all center on how the Senate fulfills its advice and consent
responsibilities. Suggested solutions abound-from increasing the Senate's
advisory role to eliminating the filibuster for judicial nominations. All of these
proposals, however, remain unheeded. To some, that may suggest that the
* problem is intractable, that we should simply accept a broken confirmation
process. That response, though, is hardly satisfying. Nor is it accurate.
The causes of the judicial confirmation mess find their origins in
constitutional structures, institutional dynamics, and electoral constraints of the
U.S. Senate. Identifying and examining those factors reveal that while the
problem is deeply rooted, it is not unresolvable. But the solution requires a
concrete and comprehensive approach-one that works to disrupt the current
judicial confirmation patterns while operating within the confines of political
realities. Moreover, Congress has faced such difficulties before and found ways
to upend legislative stalemate and take action.7 Nothing about today's
confirmation problems makes this situation any more impossible to address.
The path to a new confirmation process begins with a recognition of the
problem and its causes; it then builds from existing approaches to resolving
gridlock to find an answer to the delay and obstruction that mark judicial
appointments today; and finally it makes the case for the reforms on several
fronts.
This Article takes the same route. It begins by explaining the current
judicial confirmation problem, first by defining it and then discussing its causes
and consequences. Part III then presents the proposal. As noted above, the urged
reforms borrow from existing structures and practices to create a new
mechanism for Senate consideration of judicial nominations. In short, the
proposal includes creating selection panels to assist the Senate in advising the
President on the selection of lower court judicial nominations. Ideally, this
alone would ensure a more efficient and effective confirmation process, as the
Senate would move more quickly on nominations that it had a voice in
selecting. In reality, though, an expanded role for the Senate in selecting
nominees does not necessarily translate into a smoother confirmation process.
This Article, therefore, goes further by proposing a Senate-appointed
Confirmation Commission, modeled on the military base closure commissions,
5 The term "confirmation mess" originates with Professor Stephen Carter's law review
article and follow-up book of the same name. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION
MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994); Stephen Carter, The
Confirmation Mess, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1185 (1988).
6 See infra notes 59-80 and accompanying text.
7 Michael J. Teter, Recusal Legislating: Congress's Answer to Institutional Stalemate,
48 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 3 (2011).
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to handle stalled judicial nominations. The Commission would make
recommendations regarding confirmation or rejection of nominees, and those
suggestions would take effect absent Senate action to the contrary. Through this
approach, Senate delay and obstruction would be recalibrated to result in action,
as opposed to inaction.
Such a proposal-even though it builds off of existing structures-requires
a strong defense. Parts IV, V, and VI provide the historical, constitutional, and
political justifications for such reforms to the judicial confirmation process.
Finally, the Article ends by discussing the benefits the proposed changes would
entail and responds to the anticipated critiques of the plan.
The flaws of the current judicial confirmation process require a response.
The Senate's role in ensuring a full, vibrant, and qualified federal judiciary is a
responsibility that the chamber is constitutionally obligated to meet. It is a duty,
though, that is too often going unfulfilled. The case for change, then, is clear.
The case for dramatic reform follows.
II. UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION PROBLEM
There is no uniform understanding of the confirmation mess. For this
reason, before providing the details of the confirmation reform proposal, it is
important to define the problem. It is only then that it is possible to judge the
merits of the proposal. Moreover, a complete assessment also requires an
understanding of the causes and consequences of the problems. This Part
addresses these three issues: What does it mean to speak of a "confirmation
mess"? What are the origins of the problem? And what are the effects? Once a
picture emerges of the current confirmation process, Part III will lay out the
proposed reforms in detail.
A. Defining the Problem
1. Obstruction
Not too long ago, being nominated for a federal judgeship practically
assured one's place on the bench. 8 No longer.9 Judicial nominees often face a
perilous path to confirmation, one that prevents many of them from ever taking
office. Indeed, a comparison of the success rates for judicial nominees over the
past three decades tells the tale. For district court nominees, the confirmation
rate has fallen from 93% during President Carter's term to 78% for President
8 NANcY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS, ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER
FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENT PROCESS 2 (2005) (showing confirmation rates approaching
100% from 1933 to 1974).
9 d.; see also SARAH A. BINDER & FORREST MALTZMAN, ADVICE & DISSENT: THE
STRUGGLE TO SHAPE THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 80 tbl.4-1 (2009) (showing that the Court of
Appeals confirmation rate dropped from 100% in 1960 to 48% during President George W.
Bush's terms).
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George W. Bush's.' 0 During President Obama's first two years, the Senate
confirmed only 56% of his district court nominationsl l-all the more
remarkable because for much of that period, the Democrats enjoyed a filibuster-
proof majority. Circuit court nomination statistics are even starker. Again, the
Senate confirmed 93% of President Carter's selections. 12 That percentage
dropped to 88% for President Reagan, 76% for President George H.W. Bush,
61% for President Clinton, and 52% for President George W. Bush.'
3
Lower confirmation rates are not per se a problem. Perhaps President Carter
simply selected better nominees for the bench. Perhaps the Senate adopted
additional procedures for more accurately assessing nominees' qualifications.
Or perhaps the differences can all be attributed to the political context-whether
the president faced a friendly or hostile Senate, whether the president enjoyed
high public approval, or whether the president consulted senators frequently in
making the selections. Undoubtedly, these political considerations do affect
some confirmation outcomes. t4 And there is little that can, or necessarily
should, be done about that. But these factors alone do not account for the
remarkable decline in confirmation rates, and there is no indication that
Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush nominated less qualified candidates or
that the Senate has adopted new standards for ensuring meritorious selections. 15
Instead, "the data support the notion that the Senate confirmation process has
markedly changed" over the past twenty years, leading to fewer judicial
confirmations. 16
10 Sheldon Goldman et al., Obama's Judiciary at Midterm: The Confirmation Drama
Continues, 94 JUDICATURE 262, 293 (2011).
Il d.
12Id.
131d. The Senate has confirmed twenty-five out of forty of President Obama's circuit
court nominations, or approximately 63%. See Am. Constitution Soc'y, Federal Judicial
Nomination Statistics, JUDICIALNoMINATIONS.ORG, http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/
files/pdf/Judicial%20Nominations%2OStats%2001 %2025%2012.pdf (last visited Feb. 1,
2012). There is some minor variation in the reported confirmation rates among scholars for
each president because of differences in how one treated nominees who were re-nominated
after failing to win confirmation during a congressional session.
14Michael J. Gerhardt, Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of the Federal
Appointments Process, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 467, 514-19 (1998); see also BINDER &
MALTZMAN, supra note 9, at 81-91 (discussing forces shaping advice and consent).
15 Indeed, nearly every Clinton and George W. Bush appointee received a qualified or
well-qualified rating from the American Bar Association. See Sheldon Goldman et al., W.
Bush's Judicial Legacy: Mission Accomplished, 92 JUDICATURE 258, 279, 284 (2009).16 Sarah A. Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Congress and the Politics of Judicial
Appointments, in CONGREss RECONSIDERED 297, 300 (Lawrence C. Dodd & Bruce I.
Oppenheimer eds., 8th ed. 2005); see also supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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2. Delays
A vast majority of unsuccessful nominations are not defeated by the Senate
as much as by time, further belying the idea that the Senate has simply
established a higher standard for nominees to meet before confirmation. Senate
Rule XXXI provides, in part:
Nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during the session at which
they are made shall not be acted upon at any succeeding session without being
again made to the Senate by the President; and if the Senate shall adjourn or
take a recess for more than thirty days, all nominations pending and not finally
acted upon at the time of taking such adjournment or recess shall be returned
by the Secretary to the President, and shall not again be considered unless they
shall again be made to the Senate by the President. 17
17 STANDING RuLEs OF THE SENATE R. XXXI, in COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., U.S.
SENATE, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND
RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BusINESS OF THE U.S. SENATE, S. Doc. No. 112-1, at 58
(2011). Rule XXXI reads in full:
EXECUTIVE SESSION-PROCEEDINGS ON NOMINATIONS
1. When nominations shall be made by the President of the United States to the
Senate, they shall, unless otherwise ordered, be referred to appropriate committees; and
the final question on every nomination shall be, "Will the Senate advise and consent to
this nomination?" which question shall not be put on the same day on which the
nomination is received, nor on the day on which it may be reported by a committee,
unless by unanimous consent.
2. All business in the Senate shall be transacted in open session, unless the Senate
as provided in rule XXI by a majority vote shall determine that a particular nomination,
treaty, or other matter shall be considered in closed executive session, in which case all
subsequent proceedings with respect to said nomination, treaty, or other matter shall be
kept secret: Provided, That the injunction of secrecy as to the whole or any part of
proceedings in closed executive session may be removed on motion adopted by a
majority vote of the Senate in closed executive session: Provided further, That any
Senator may make public his vote in closed executive session.
3. When a nomination is confirmed or rejected, any Senator voting in the majority
may move for a reconsideration on the same day on which the vote was taken, or on
either of the next two days of actual executive session of the Senate; but if a notification
of the confirmation or rejection of a nomination shall have been sent to the President
before the expiration of the time within which a motion to reconsider may be made, the
motion to reconsider shall be accompanied by a motion to request the President to
return such notification to the Senate. Any motion to reconsider the vote on a
nomination may be laid on the table without prejudice to the nomination, and shall be a
final disposition of such motion.
4. Nominations confirmed or rejected by the Senate shall not be returned by the
Secretary to the President until the expiration of the time limited for making a motion to
reconsider the same, or while a motion to reconsider is pending unless otherwise
ordered by the Senate.
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Thus, senators know that if they can delay a nomination, they can defeat it.
And, of course, senators enjoy a vast array of tools to stall judicial nominations,
including failing to agree to hearings, refusing to return blue slips, filing
motions to recommit, demanding floor debate and recorded votes, placing
holds, and threatening filibusters. 18 The effects of these tactics can again be
seen through a comparative look at the time it used to take to complete the
confirmation process versus today.
The statistics show that a judicial nominee today is less likely even to
receive a hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee, and this is especially
true for circuit court selections. During President Carter's term, over 96% of his
district court nominees and over 98% of his circuit court selections received a
Judiciary Committee hearing. 19 Those numbers declined to the point that during
President Clinton's two terms, only 85% of district court nominees and 70% of
circuit court nominees received a hearing.20 Moreover, for those who did
receive a hearing, the average wait from nomination to the hearing grew
dramatically. By President W. Bush's term, district court nominees waited over
one hundred days before a hearing, 21 while circuit court nominees averaged
over 230 days from nomination to the date of the hearing. 22 The number of days
5. When the Senate shall adjourn or take a recess for more than thirty days, all
motions to reconsider a vote upon a nomination which has been confirmed or rejected
by the Senate, which shall be pending at the time of taking such adjournment or recess,
shall fall; and the Secretary shall return all such nominations to the President as
confirmed or rejected by the Senate, as the case may be.
6. Nominations neither confirmed nor rejected during the session at which they are
made shall not be acted upon at any succeeding session without being again made to the
Senate by the President; and if the Senate shall adjourn or take a recess for more than
thirty days, all nominations pending and not finally acted upon at the time of taking
such adjournment or recess shall be returned by the Secretary to the President, and shall
not again be considered unless they shall again be made to the Senate by the President.
7. (a) The Official Reporters shall be furnished with a list of nominations to office
after the proceedings of the day on which they are received, and a like list of all
confirmations and rejections.
(b) All nominations to office shall be prepared for the printer by the Official
Reporter, and printed in the Congressional Record, after the proceedings of the day in
which they are received, also nominations recalled, and confirmed.
(c) The Secretary shall furnish to the press, and to the public upon request, the
names of nominees confirmed or rejected on the day on which a final vote shall be had,
except when otherwise ordered by the Senate.
Id. at 57-59.
1 8 MITCHEL A. SOLLENBERGER, JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROLS
129-55 (2011) (discussing the process nominations must go through on the Senate floor and
the opportunities for delay and obstruction).19 Goldman, supra note 4, at 253-54.
2 0 d.
2 1 Id. at 253.
22 1d. at 254.
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from the hearing to being reported to the Senate and then the amount of time
nominations spent lingering on the Senate floor also increased significantly.23
And these figures are for those nominees who actually receive a hearing.
Unsuccessful appellate court nominees now often languish for a year and a half
before seeing their nominations die as time runs out.2 4
In the end, as scholars of the judicial confirmations have noted, "Numerous
indicators suggest that something has gone awry in the process of advice and
consent for selecting federal judges."25 As the statistics show, delays and
obstructionism are now standard features of the judicial confirmation process.
3. Focus on Non-Merits
It seems axiomatic, but necessary, to declare that the Senate judicial
confirmation process should focus on the nominee. The question before the
Senate is whether to "advise and consent" to that individual's assuming a
position on the federal bench.26 It seems further self-evident that when focusing
on the nominee, the question should be about qualifications. Admittedly, the
issue of what it means to be "qualified" to serve on the federal bench is open for
debate. Some senators and commentators would limit that term to easily
assessed qualifications such as educational background, work experience, and
professionalism and work quality.2 7 Others include the nominee's judicial
temperament and ideology. 28 There is no reason to enter that fray because, no
matter what one's definition of qualifications, the Senate is often only
minimally focused on the nominee's merits, no matter what the standard.
2 3 Id. at 253-54.
24 Sarah Binder & Forrest Maltzman, Advice and Consent During the Bush Years: The
Politics of Confirming Federal Judges, 92 JUDICATURE 320, 323 (2009).25 Id. at 322.
2 6 See STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE R. XXXI, in COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., U.S.
SENATE, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND
RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE U.S. SENATE, S. Doc. No. 112-1, at 57
(2011) ("[A]nd the final question on every nomination shall be, 'Will the Senate advise and
consent to this nomination?"').2 7 See, e.g., Judicial Nominations 2001: Should Ideology Matter?: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th
Cong. 13-14 (2001) [hereinafter Should Ideology Matter?] (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 22-26 (statement of Lloyd N. Cutler, Co-Chair,
Constitution Project's Courts Initiative); id. at 29-39 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); DAVID M. O'BRIEN, JUDICIAL ROULETTE: REPORT OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND TASK FORCE ON JUDICIAL SELECTION 49 (1988).
28 Should Ideology Matter?, supra note 27, at 1-3 (statement of Sen. Charles Schumer,
Member, S. Comm. on the Judiciary); id. at 39-49 (statement of Laurence Tribe, Professor,
Harvard Law School); id. at 57-67 (statement of Cass Sunstein, Professor, University of
Chicago Law School).
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Instead, the Senate has increasingly used its role in the judicial
appointments process as a powerful political tool.29 Senators will delay
nominations as a means of forcing the Senate or president to acquiesce to some
other, unrelated demand. 30 Or the Senate Judiciary chairman from a different
party than the president's may slow down the entire process for all judicial
nominees in hopes that the next president will share the same party as the
chairman.31 The other party then responds in kind in an exasperating game of
tit-for-tat.32 Additionally, the confirmation process itself is now treated as a
"venue for facilitating or impeding a president's realization of his broader
agenda."'33 It should come as no surprise, then, when scholars study the current
confirmation process they find "little evidence" showing that the quality of the
nominee has much effect on the appointment's fate. 34
B. Ascertaining the Causes of the Problem
What has caused these problems? There is, of course, no one answer, and it
is also difficult to determine the extent to which the contributing causes affect
the process. That said, it is possible to trace many of the roots of the growing
dysfunction to three broad trends.
First, the federal judiciary enjoys ever-growing influence over public policy
in the United States. 35 Judges on even the most "inferior" courts therefore play
an important role in interpreting and shaping federal law. As the two dominant
political parties become more ideologically opposed, 36 judges are dealing with
more contentious laws and legal matters.37 The growing importance of the
federal judiciary, then, has sparked an ideological "war" 38 over judicial
selection, contributing to the delays and obstruction discussed above.
Second, the judicial confirmation process has become part of the partisan-,
electoral-, and interest group-driven politics that we typically associate with the
29 Charles W. Pickering, Sr. & Bradley S. Clanton, A Proposal: Codification by Statute
of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 807, 811 (2006).
30 See AMY STEIGERWALT, BATTLE OVER THE BENCH: SENATORS, INTEREST GROUPS,
AND LOWER COURT CONFIRMATIONS 87 (2010) ("Judicial nominations have become a key
bargaining tool in the modem Senate ... ").3 1 LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
APPOINTMENTS 90 (2005); see also Binder & Maltzman, supra note 16, at 308.
32 Goldman et al., supra note 15, at 288.
33 Gerhardt, supra note 14, at 473.
34 Binder & Maltzman, supra note 16, at 309.
3 5 BINDER & MALTZMAN, supra note 9, at 1.
36 Binder & Maltzman, supra note 16, at 313.
3 7 BENJAMIN WITTES, CONFIRMATION WARS: PRESERVING INDEPENDENT COURTS IN
ANGRY TIMES 11-13 (2006); Nancy Scherer, The Judicial Confirmation Process: Mobilizing
Elites, Mobilizing Masses, 86 JUDICATURE 240, 243 (2003).
38 See generally Michael J. Gerhardt, Judicial Selection as War, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
667 (2003).
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legislative process. 39 Studies show that delays and obstruction are greatest
during times of divided government, 40 helping to prove the importance of
partisanship in the process. But as recent experience shows, unified government
does not significantly reduce the ability of the oppositional party to seek to
delay the confirmation process. Indeed, obstructing judicial appointments has
been an important part of Senate Republican Leader Mitch McConnell's overall
strategy to thwart President Obama's agenda.41 Electoral considerations also
play a significant role. For example, statistics show that during presidential
election years, the confirmation process slows dramatically.42 This phenomenon
is well recognized and even considered by some to be a "natural" occurrence.43
More troubling, though, is the electoral benefit senators see in obstructing the
judicial appointment process. Senators use their opposition to nominees as a
way to raise campaign contributions and rouse their base. 44 Increasing interest
group involvement in the judicial confirmation process also surfaces as one of
the chief causes of the problems discussed above. Senators turn to like-minded
interest groups for information on nominees and for signals as to which
nominees deserve increased scrutiny.45 And interest groups are more often
entering the fray by directly opposing or supporting nominees, with designs to
further agitate base voters and push senators toward extremes. 46
Finally, institutional rules that allow senators to promote individual interests
over those of the chamber are a chief cause of the delays and obstructionism
detailed above. First, as Michael Gerhardt has stated, "The aggrandizement of
Senate committees has made it easier for smaller blocs ... or even
individual[s]. . . to thwart nominations. '47 Moreover, whether a senator serves
on the Judiciary Committee or not, she enjoys a wide range of tools that she can
employ to obstruct the judicial confirmations. 48 This alone, though, is not new.
What is more recent, and what contributes to the "confirmation mess" is the
changing norm that encourages this practice. Senators can now engage in
39 See, e.g., C. Lawrence Evans, How Senators Decide: An Exploration, in U.S. SENATE
EXCEPTIONALISM 262,271-76 (Bruce I. Oppenheimer ed., 2002) (explaining the importance
of constituents, party leaders, and interest groups in how senators make legislative
decisions).
40Binder & Maltzman, supra note 16, at 307-08. Here, divided government means
opposing parties controlling the White House and the Senate.
41 See Jonathan Bernstein, Empty Bench Syndrome, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 9, 2011, at A27
("Senator McConnell made clear his party would filibuster every item on President Obama's
agenda, including judicial nominations.").
4 2 BINDER & MALTZMAN, supra note 9, at 89.
43 Binder & Maltzman, supra note 24, at 326.
441d at 328 ("Both parties ... have made the plight of potential judges central to their
campaigns for the White House and Congress.").
45 STEIGERWALT, supra note 30, at 160-62.
46 Nancy Scherer et al., Sounding the Fire Alarm: The Role of Interest Groups in the
Lower Federal Court Confirmation Process, 70 J. POL. 1026, 1029 (2008).
47 Gerhardt, supra note 14, at 491.48 Scherer et al., supra note 46, at 1027.
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"stealth filibusters" and silent holds that can tie up nominations indefinitely.49
For example, during the 101st Congress (1989-1990), no holds were placed on
a circuit court nomination.50 During the 108th Congress (2003-2004), senators
placed twenty holds.51 These holds are often unrelated to the merits of the
nomination itself and are instead a way for the individual senator to promote her
own political, ideological, or idiosyncratic agenda.52 The result, no matter what
the motivation, is delay and obstruction.
Thus, senators from the opposing party of the president now have the power
and incentive to block judicial nominations with impunity. The combination of
those two realities has contributed significantly to the current confirmation
problem.
C. Consequences of the Current System
It is important to understand the consequences of the current confirmation
system. The most obvious outcome is a high vacancy rate among the federal
judiciary. There are currently eighty-five vacancies on the federal bench,
representing just under 10% of the entire federal judiciary. 53 Of those, thirty-
seven have been declared "judicial emergencies" by the Administrative Office
of the U.S. Courts. 54 While some of these continued vacancies are attributable
to the slow pace at which the Obama Administration has sent nominations to the
Senate, 55 during the last session of Congress the Senate failed to confirm over
forty judicial nominees. 56 Moreover, the sluggishness of the Obama
Administration is at least partly attributable to the fact that there is little point in
flooding the Senate with more nominations when it appears the chamber is
unwilling or unable to deal with even a modest volume. 57 Additionally, the
vacancy rate would be considerably lower had the Senate acted on many of the
49David S. Law, Appointing Federal Judges: The President, the Senate, and the
Prisoner's Dilemma, 26 CARDOZO L. REv. 479, 493 (2005).50 STEIGERWALT, supra note 30, at 84-88.
51 Id.
52 1d. at 75-94 (discussing the use of holds by senators).
53 Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 3. This number does not include twenty
"future vacancies," in which a judge has announced her plans to retire. Admin. Office of the
U.S. Courts, Future Judicial Vacancies, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAnd
Judgeships/JudicialVacancies/FutureJudicialVacancies.aspx (last updated Feb. 1, 2012).54 Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Emergencies, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAndJudgeships/JudicialVacancies/JudicialEmergencies.aspx
(last visited Feb. 1, 2012).55 See Am. Constitution Soc'y, supra note 13 (comparing the number of nominations
made by Presidents Obama, W. Bush, and Clinton at the same points in their presidencies).56 Goldman et al., supra note 10, at 293.
57 Evidence suggests that when presidents overload the Senate Judiciary Committee
with nominations, it slows down the entire process. See Carl W. Tobias, Postpartisan
Federal Judicial Selection, 51 B.C. L. REv. 769, 773 (2010).
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nominations President W. Bush made during his final two years in office.58 One
consequence of the confirmation wars is a federal judiciary operating
dangerously under capacity.
Relatedly, then, the administration of justice suffers. Both Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Chief Justice Roberts warned the Senate that failing to address
the high vacancy rate would "erod[e] the quality of justice. '59 Courts have had
to cancel oral arguments, postpone cases for several months, and dramatically
increase the amount of time it takes to dispose of a matter.60 Additionally, Sarah
Binder and Forrest Maltzman examined the effect that confirmation battles have
on the legitimacy and perceived independence of the judiciary. They found that
people were more distrustful of the decisions by judges who faced difficult
confirmation proceedings as the boundary between the law and politics was
eroded.61 Binder and Maltzman concluded that "[n]ominees that engender
pitched battles-rightly or wrongly-ultimately may put the legitimacy of the
unelected bench at risk."'62
There is also the likely consequence that fewer qualified individuals will
show a willingness to subject themselves and their families to the uncertainty
and personal scrutiny that accompanies nomination. And those people who are
nominated often end up embittered or contemptuous of the process-even if
they ultimately are confirmed. 63
Finally, the Senate itself suffers under the current system. The perpetual
fights over judicial nominations "take[s] a toll,"64 as senators accuse each other
of misrepresenting facts, dealing unfairly with nominees, and abusing Senate
rules. 65 For a chamber that operates through unanimous consent agreements 66
and the norm of senatorial courtesy and reciprocity, 67 constant battles over
58 In July 2006, there were only forty-five vacancies. See Admin. Office of the U.S.
Courts, Archive of Judicial Vacancies, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/JudgesAnd
Judgeships/JudicialVacancies/ArchiveOfJudicialVacancies.aspx (last updated Feb. 1, 2012).
59William H. Rehnquist, 1997 Year-End Report of the Federal Judiciary, THIRD
BRANCH, Jan. 1998, at 1, 2. Chief Justice Roberts noted in his 2010 year-end report that the
current judicial confirmation process "has created acute difficulties for some judicial
districts." John G. Roberts, Jr., 2010 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary, THIRD
BRANCH, Jan. 2011, at 1, 3, available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-
end/20 1 Oyear-endreport.pdf.
6 0 BINDER & MALTZMAN, supra note 9, at 128-30.
61Id. at 136-42.
6 2 1d. at 142.
63 Pickeing & Clanton, supra note 29, at 808.
64Binder & Maltzman, supra note 16, at 315.65 See generally E. Stewart Moritz, "Statistical Judo ": The Rhetoric of Senate Inaction
in the Judicial Appointment Process, 22 J.L. & POL. 341 (2006) (chronicling the complaints
and frustrations senators express with the confirmation process).
6 6 WALTER J. OLESZEK, CONGRESSIONAL PROCEDURES AND THE POLICY PROCESs 232-
42 (8th ed. 2011) (discussing the use of unanimous consent agreements in the Senate
legislative process).
67 Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REv. 181, 223
(1997).
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judicial nominees may ultimately wreak havoc on the institution's ability to
function.
This, then, is what I mean by the "confirmation mess." The next Part takes
up explaining the proposed reforms.
III. CLEANING UP THE CONFIRMATION MESS: A PROPOSAL
As the previous Part shows, the judicial confirmation process is marked by
tactical partisanship, electoral considerations, ideological battles, logrolling,
interest group politics, and retribution 68-all leading to increasing delays or
deadlock. It is no wonder, then, that every few years legal scholars and political
leaders focus on this confirmation "mess" and offer prescriptions for the ailing
system. 69 These proposals run the gamut, from changes in Senate norms, 70 to
rules reform, 71 to binding statutes, 72 and even judicial intervention.73 Some
68 See supra Part II.A.
69 See, e.g., S. Res. 327, 108th Cong. (2004) (proposal by Senator Arlen Specter to
create timetables for Senate consideration of judicial nominations); President George W.
Bush, Remarks by the President on Judicial Confirmations (Oct. 30, 2002), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021030-6.html. See
generally Carter, supra note 5; John Comyn, Our Broken Judicial Confirmation Process and
the Need for Filibuster Reform, 27 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 181 (2004); Brannon P.
Denning, Reforming the New Confirmation Process: Replacing "Despite and Resent" with
"Advice and Consent," 53 ADMiN. L. REV. 1 (2001); Laura T. Gorjanc, The Solution to the
Filibuster Problem: Putting the Advice Back in Advice and Consent, 54 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 1435 (2004); Douglas W. Kmiec & Elliot Mincberg, The Role of the Senate in Judicial
Confirmations, 7 TEx. REV. L. & POL. 235 (2003); Pickering & Clanton, supra note 29; Lee
Renzin, Advice, Consent, and Senate Inaction-Is Judicial Resolution Possible?, 73 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1739 (1998); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Taking Advice Seriously: An Immodest
Proposal for Reforming the Confirmation Process, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1577 (1992); Karl A.
Schweitzer, Litigating the Appointments Clause: The Most Effective Solution for Senate
Obstruction of the Judicial Confirmation Process, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 909 (2010);
Stephanie K. Seymour, The Judicial Appointment Process: How Broken Is It?, 39 TULSA L.
REV. 691 (2004).
70 See, e.g., CARTER, supra note 5, at 159 (proposing a shift away from a presumption
in favor of confirmation to one that requires the nominee to prove her qualifications); David
A. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Senate, the Constitution, and the Confirmation Process,
101 YALE L.J. 1491, 1514-20 (1992) (urging a more independent role for the Senate in the
advising and consenting to judicial nominations).7 1 See, e.g., S. Res. 327, 108th Cong. (2004); 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 407 (1998); Comyn, supra note 69, at 206 (proposing eliminating the
filibuster for judicial nominations); Denning, supra note 69, at 31-38 (suggesting amending
Senate rules to limit the use of the hold, lower the threshold for cloture on nominations, and
curb the power of the Judiciary Committee chair); Calvin R. Massey, Getting There: A Brief
History of the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1, 14-16
(1991); Reynolds, supra note 69, at 1580 (encouraging expedited consideration of Supreme
Court nominees if the President selects from a Senate-created list); Brent Wible, Filibuster
vs. Supermajority Rule: From Polarization to a Consensus- and Moderation-Forcing
Mechanism for Judicial Confirmations, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 923, 923-25 (2005)
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scholars promote an increased role for the Senate in judicial selection, 74 while
others suggest greater deference to presidential selection. 75 Despite the many
differences among these ideas, they all treat the confirmation process as a
different beast than the legislative process. In other words, commentators
offering these suggestions look for answers to the "confirmation mess" in the
ways in which judicial confirmation is different from the typical legislative
process. That makes sense because the confirmation process does offer
significant differences from the mechanisms through which a bill becomes a
law. 76
In actuality, the problems afflicting the confirmation process--delays,
partisanship, institutional norms, and electoral politics-are the same ones that
congressional processes suffer from more broadly. Moreover, many of the same
"vetogates" 77 that complicate the legislative process are also implicated in the
confirmation process-the committee system, holds, unanimous consent
agreements, and the filibuster, to name a few.78 It follows, then, that past efforts
to address congressional stalemate more generally might serve as a model for
resolving the delays and difficulties associated with judicial nominations. Of
course, few would claim that Congress has adequately dealt with the stalemate
that reigns. Indeed, inaction, partisanship, and politics still dominate Congress.
Congress has, however, developed a form of lawmaking, referred to elsewhere
as "recusal legislating, '79 that occasionally allows it to overcome those features
when the moment is right. 80 And though the moment is rarely right, and there
are therefore only a few examples of recusal legislating, one such instance
serves as a useful model for resolving the stalemate now associated with
judicial nominations.
(calling for supermajority requirements for judicial confirmation); Judith Resnik,
Supermajority Rule, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2003, at A3 1.7 2 See, e.g., Pickering & Clanton, supra note 29, at 816-19.
73 See, e.g., Renzin, supra note 69, at 1751-72; Schweitzer, supra note 69, at 922-25.
74 See, e.g., Gorjanc, supra note 69, at 1457-63; Reynolds, supra note 69, at 1578-80;
Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1517-20.
75 See, e.g., John C. Eastman, The Limited Nature of the Senate's Advice and Consent
Role, 36 U.C. DAvIs L. REv. 633, 646-48 (2003); Pickering & Clanton, supra note 29, at
819.
76 For example, there is no need for bicameral action: the President initiates the process
by forwarding a nomination to the Senate, and the Presentment and Veto Clauses are
inapplicable.
77 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Vetogates, Chevron, Preemption, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1441, 1444-48 (2008). "Vetogates" are procedural doors through which a bill must pass to
become law. Each of these "gates" presents an opportunity for opponents of the measure to
kill the bill rather than allowing it to move along to the next stage of the process. See
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND
THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 66-68 (4th ed. 2007).
7 8 See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 77, at 66-68.
79 Teter, supra note 7, at 3.80 Id. at4.
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A. Military Base Closures as a Model for Resolving the Judicial
Confirmation Problem
The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and
Realignment Act (BRAC),81 first enacted in 1988, solved the decade-long
problem Congress faced in closing the U.S. military bases. 82 Until 1976, the
executive branch, through the Department of Defense, enjoyed nearly unbridled
discretion in determining which bases to close or consolidate, and from 1961 to
1977, the Pentagon closed ninety-four bases.83 While these closures made sense
from a practical and financial standpoint, they infuriated those members of
Congress who represented a military district, more so because of the unilateral
nature of the determination and the belief that many closure decisions were
made with politics in mind.84
In 1976, Congress enacted a military construction bill that, in essence,
required congressional approval for any base realignment or closure.85 The
result was that from 1977 until passage of the BRAC legislation in 1988, the
Pentagon did not close a single major base, despite a manifest desire to do so
and the broadly held opinion that such closures were necessary. 86 Committee
chairs who had military bases in their districts, interest groups, and electoral
considerations proved to be the most notable obstacles to base closures.87
Moreover, legislators who supported base closures saw little electoral benefit to
pushing closures, especially if it meant alienating powerful colleagues.88
The BRAC law allowed Congress to overcome this stalemate by creating
the Base Closure and Realignment Commission and delegating to it the
responsibility for determining which military bases should be closed.89 Nine
members, appointed by the President but requiring the input of congressional
leaders, comprise the Commission.90 The Commission operates for a period of
81 Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, Pub. L.
No. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988) (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note (2006)).
Although the correct acronym would seem to be "BRCA," the Pentagon apparently preferred
"BRAC." See 2005 BRAC Definitions, U.S. DEP'T OF DEF.,
http://www.defense.gov/brac/definitionsbrac2005.html (last visited Jan. 6, 2012).
82 Teter, supra note 7, at 8-12.
8 3 DAVID SORENSON, MILITARY BASE CLOSURE: A REFERENCE HANDBOOK 14-19
(2007).84 Teter, supra note 7, at 9-11.
85 Military Construction and Guard and Reserve Forces Facilities Authorization Acts,
Pub. L. No. 94-431, 90 Stat. 1349 (1976).86 See, e.g., 134 CONG. REC. 17,060 (1988) (statement of Rep. Kyl) (noting that since
1977, Congress had not authorized closing any bases; id. at 10,196 (statement of Sen.
Dixon).87 See id. at 17,056-87.
88 Teter, supra note 7, at 12.
89Id.
90 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-107,
§ 3001, 115 Stat. 1012, 1344 (adding § 2912(d)(3) to 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note (2006));
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one year, during which time it holds public hearings and gathers information to
assess the current structural needs of the Pentagon. 91 The Commission then
creates a set of recommendations, which it submits, along with a report
containing its findings and conclusions, to the President and Congress.92 The
President must then decide whether to approve the list, which he can do only as
a package. 93 If the President accepts the Commission's proposal, he transmits a
certification to Congress. 94 The law then requires the Defense Secretary to
follow the Commission's recommendations unless Congress passes a joint
resolution disapproving the Commission's proposal within forty-five days.95
The BRAC law established strict, fast-track procedures through which
Congress can pass a joint disapproval resolution. First, the law provides the
precise text of the resolution and requires the resolution be introduced within
ten days after the President transmits the certification to Congress. 96 The
resolution must then be referred to the House and Senate Committees on Armed
Services. 97 If either Committee fails to report the resolution out to the full
chamber, the resolution is automatically discharged from the Committee twenty
days after the President's transmittal.98 On the floor of the chamber the
resolution enjoys streamlined consideration with procedural mechanisms, such
as points of order, amendments, and motions to postpone consideration, that are
often used to delay or kill legislation disallowed.99 Only a single quorum call
may be held, but then "the vote on final passage of the resolution shall
occur."
100
With the BRAC law, Congress sought to overcome the institutional
structures, practices, rules, and norms that had frustrated military base policy. In
fact, more than surmount those obstacles, the BRAC procedure reversed the
Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2902(a), (c),
104 Stat. 1808, 1808 (current version at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note (2006)).
91 National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, § 3001, 115 Stat. at 1344
(adding § 2912(d)(4) to 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note (2006)).
92 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act § 2903(d)(2)-(3), 104 Stat. at 1811-12.
93 1d. § 2903(e)(2), 104 Stat. at 1812; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2002, § 3003, 115 Stat. at 1347 (adding § 2914(e)(1) to 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note (2006)).
However, the President may disapprove some of the recommended closures and send those
back to the Commission for reconsideration. Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act
§ 2903(e)(3), 104 Stat. at 1812. The Commission can then prepare a revised list. National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, § 3003, 115 Stat. at 1347 (adding
§ 2914(e)(1) to 10 U.S.C. § 2687 note (2006)). The President then must act (or decline to
act) on the list as a package. Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act § 2903(e)(4)-(5),
104 Stat. at 1812. No option exists for the President to disapprove some closures and
forward the remaining recommendations to Congress. See id.
94 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act § 2903(e)(2), 104 Stat. at 1812.
95 Id. § 2904, 104 Stat. at 1812-13.
961d. § 2908(a), 104 Stat. at 1816-17.
97 Id. § 2908(b), 104 Stat. at 1817.
98 1d. § 2908(c), 104 Stat. at 1817.
9 9 1d. § 2908(d)(2), 104 Stat. at 1817.
100 Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act § 2908(d)(3), 104 Stat. at 1817.
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legislative "vetogates" to make it nearly impossible for Congress to prevent the
Commission's proposals from taking effect. In short, Congress designed the
BRAC law to rise above the "small group of dedicated Members of Congress,"
who, "applying all of the tricks of the trade, have been very effective in being
able to block any base closure for the past 12 years."''
The BRAC approach to military base closures has proven very successful,
with Congress authorizing five rounds of the BRAC Commission, resulting in
over one hundred major base closures and saving billions of dollars. 10 2 Military
base closures are, admittedly, quite different than confirming federal judges.
Why, then, does the BRAC law serve as a model for judicial confirmations?
The decade long stalemate associated with military base closures is not
materially unlike the delays and standoffs facing nominees and the problems
associated with base closures and judicial confirmation situations share many of
the same causes. Thus, if the BRAC law was able to successfully solve the base
closure dilemma, it could serve as a valuable template for addressing judicial
confirmations.
It is easy to see the key features of the BRAC law that made it work: (1)
creating an independent commission that would hold hearings and research the
matter of base closures; (2) imposing restrictions on how the Commission
staffed itself to ensure that its judgment remained independent of the Pentagon's
and Congress's; (3) establishing an expedited, or "fast-track," means for
Congress to consider the Commission's proposal; and (4) writing into the law a
presumption that the Commission's proposal would become effective absent
congressional action to the contrary.
B. The Judicial Confirmation Reform Proposal
With the BRAC approach laid out, it is possible to construct a more detailed
proposal for addressing the problems associated with judicial confirmations.
The Senate should amend its rules to create a BRAC-like solution to the
confirmation problem. The rule would require senators to establish state-based
and circuit-based Selection Panels to assist in identifying and recommending
candidates for judicial appointment. Additionally, the rule would create a
Confirmation Commission, to which delayed or obstructed judicial nominations
would be referred. And, finally, the rule would establish a presumption of
validity for the Confirmation Commission's recommendations and a fast-track
procedure for the Senate to act.
Let me quickly review the proposed process. For each vacancy on a lower
federal court, a Selection Panel in the district or circuit would put together a list
of suggested nominees that senators representing the relevant area will then
101 134 CONG. REC. 17,057 (1988) (statement of Rep. Dickinson).
102 Kenneth Mayer, The Base Realignment and Closure Process: Is It Possible to Make
Rational Policy?, JOHN BRANDEMAS CENTER FOR STUDY OF CONGRESS, I (Dec. 2007),
http://www.nyu.edu/brademas/pdf/Mayer--Defense%20FINAL.pdf.
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forward, in whole or in part, to the President. If the President nominates an
individual from the list, the new procedures would take effect. Once the
President forwards a nomination to the Senate, it would be immediately referred
to the Senate Judiciary Committee, as is the current practice. The Judiciary
Committee would be instructed to conduct a hearing within thirty days (for
district court nominees) or sixty days (for circuit court nominees). If the
Judiciary Committee fails to complete a hearing within the requisite period, the
nomination would be referred to the Confirmation Commission. If the Judiciary
Committee conducts a hearing but fails to vote on the nomination within thirty
days of completing the hearing, the nomination would be referred to the
Commission. Finally, if the nomination makes it out of Committee, but the full
Senate fails to take up the matter within thirty days, that, too, would trigger the
Commission mechanism.
The Commission would be composed of a fixed number of members, with
the Senate majority leader and Judiciary Committee chair appointing a majority.
The rule would impose restrictions on who may serve on, or staff, the panel to
promote familiarity with the law and judging. Once a nominee has been referred
to the Commission, it will interview the candidate, review the candidate's
record, and conduct hearings. The Commission will be expected to then make a
recommendation as to whether or not the Senate should confirm the nominee.
The Commission would need to transmit its recommendation to the Senate
within sixty days or at least thirty-five days before the close of the Senate
session, whichever is earlier. The Senate would then have thirty days to pass a
resolution disapproving the Commission's recommendation. The resolution
would be entitled to the fast-track procedures similar to those used for the
BRAC law.10 3 If the Senate fails to pass the resolution within the required
period, the Commission's recommendation would take effect. Put simply, if the
Commission approves a nominee and the Senate does not act, the Senate will be
deemed as having consented to the nomination. The Secretary of the Senate will
forward a certification of confirmation to the President.
That is the basic outline of the proposal. The next several sections will
explain why this approach works from a historical, constitutional, and political
perspective. But before getting to that, let me break down the component parts
of the package to explain the thinking behind them and to show that,
individually, each of the components is built around other proposals or
mechanisms already used by Congress in other settings.
1. Statute Versus Rule?
The starting point, of course, was to determine what form the proposal
should take. The two best options would be through a statute, enacted by
Congress and signed by the President or by the Senate, amending its rules
related to judicial confirmations. The statutory approach to confirmation
103 See supra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
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process reforms has been proposed at various points in the past,10 4 and was
required for the BRAC law because of the need for bicameral enactment. But
judicial confirmations are different in this respect. Unlike the process for
enacting a law, which is spelled out specifically in the Constitution,'0 5 the
Framers did not elaborate on how the Senate should fulfill its responsibility to
advise and consent to judicial nominations. As things currently stand,
nominations are governed by Senate Rules. 106 A rule change has the advantage
of not requiring passage in the House of Representatives, nor signing by the
President, thereby avoiding several roadblocks to reform. Moreover, for those
concerned that a rule would carry less weight than a statute, the precedent
actually suggests the reverse is true. 107 Congress has expressed unease about the
constitutionality of statutized rules 10 8 that seek to bind future congresses.
Indeed, most statutized rules now contain explicit disclaimers that either
chamber can disregard the rule as it sees fit. 109 On the other hand, the Senate
has shown remarkable fealty to its rules, even when a majority of its members
express a desire to change them.110 As such, a rule might actually do a better
job of "binding" the Senate to the new confirmation mechanism than a statute.
I will discuss at length in Part V whether a rule could, legally and
practically, establish the proposed Selection Panels and Confirmation
Commission. In short, though, the answer is yes. Both chambers have used the
Constitution's Rules of Proceedings Clause to create a number of independent
104 See, e.g., Sarah A. Binder & Thomas E. Mann, Slaying the Dinosaur: The Case for
Reforming the Senate Filibuster, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 1995, at 42, 42; Denning, supra
note 69; Massey, supra note 71, at 14-16; Pickering & Clanton, supra note 29, at 817-18;
Reynolds, supra note 69, at 1580.
105 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
10 6 STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE R. XXXI, in COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., U.S.
SENATE, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND
RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE U.S. SENATE, S. Doc. No. 112-1, at 57-59
(2011).
10 7 See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Using Statutes to Set Legislative Rules: Entrenchment,
Separation of Powers, and the Rules of Proceedings Clause, 19 J.L. & POL. 345, 365 (2003)
("[T]he bulk of our laws about lawmaking include provisions that render their special
statutory procedures no different, and no more legally durable, than any other rule of
proceeding.").108 Id. at 365-66.
109Id. at 365.
110Compare Dan Friedman, Senate's Returning Democrats Unanimously Favor
Filibuster Reform, NAT'L J. (Dec. 22, 2010, 3:12 PM), http://www.nationaljournal.com/
congress/senate-s-retuming-democrats-unanimously-favor-filibuster-reform-20101222
(stating that every Democratic senator, constituting a majority of the chamber, urged
Majority Leader Harry. Reid to move forward with reforming filibuster rules), with Carl
Hulse, Senate Democrats Drop Campaign to Limit Filibuster, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 2011, at
A20 (stating that Democrats "abandoned" efforts to overhaul the Senate rules to curb
filibusters).
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panels and commissions,i l I and there is nothing to suggest that the Senate could
not similarly establish the Selection Panels and Confirmation Commission
through a simple, unicameral resolution.
2. Selection Panels
The Selection Panels are modeled after similar advisory groups already
used by some senators in suggesting judicial nominations to the President. l 2
For example, Florida's senators established the first selection panel in 1974.113
Today, the Florida "nominating commission" consists of fifty-six members who
interview candidates for vacancies in the state's federal district courts and then
forward a list of six finalists to the state's two U.S. senators. 114 The senators
then select one finalist to recommend to the President.115
Wisconsin has an eleven-member "nominating commission" that its
senators activate when a vacancy occurs in the state's federal district courts.1 16
A charter spells out the commission's membership and procedures in detail., 1 7
The State Bar of Wisconsin appoints two members, and one member is the dean
of one of the state's law schools. 118 Then, when both senators and the President
are from the same party, each senator appoints four members. 119 When just one
senator is of the same party as the President, that senator appoints five
members, with the other senator appointing three. 120 If both senators are of a
different political party than the President, each senator appoints two members
of the commission, and the most senior elected official of the President's party
appoints four members. 12
Senators in at least eighteen other states use some form of an advisory
group to assist in recommending candidates for nomination to the federal
bench.' 22 Thus, the proposed Selection Panels formalize what is currently
employed informally and expands their use to circuit court appointments. The
1 1 1 MATTHEW E. GLASSMAN & JACOB R. STRAUSS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40076,
CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSIONS: OVERVIEW, STRUCTURE, AND LEGISLATIVE
CONSIDERATIONS 1 (2011) (discussing congressional creation of independent commissions
and advisory panels).
112See, e.g., Carl Tobias, Judge Thompson and the Appellate Court Confirmation
Process, 91 B.U. L. REV. 727, 729 (2011).1 13 Federal Judicial Selection: Federal Judicial Nominating Commissions, AM.
JUDICATURE SoC'Y, http://www.judicialselection.us/federaljudicialselection/federal-
judicial nominating commissions.cfm?state=FD (last visited Jan. 7, 2012).1141d.
115Id.
'
1 6 Id116id.
1181d.
119 Federal Judicial Selection, supra note 113.
120 Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
[Vol. 73:2
RETHINKING CONSENT
primary purpose of including the Selection Panels in the proposal is that they
offer a valuable means of aiding in the nomination of qualified judicial
candidates. But, almost equally important as I will discuss later, the panels also
elevate the Senate's role in advising on judicial appointments. This helps to
balance the somewhat diminished consenting role the Senate would play for
nominations that proceed through the Confirmation Commission.
3. Confirmation Commission
The Confirmation Commission would be created at the start of each new
session of Congress, serving for the two-year term. It would be tasked with
conducting a thorough investigation of the nominee, reporting its findings to the
Senate, and making a recommendation as to whether the Senate should approve
or disapprove of the nomination.
As with the BRAC Commission, the Confirmation Commission's
recommendation would enjoy a presumption that the Senate agrees with the
Commission's report unless the Senate acts within a specified timeframe to
disapprove it. The presumption, undoubtedly the most striking element of the
proposal, is a necessary component of a plan aiming to remove the
obstructionism associated with judicial nominations and to return the focus to
the candidate's professional qualifications. The table must be turned so that
inaction by the Senate equals action. Moreover, just instituting fast-track
consideration of the nomination is insufficient. If each individual nomination is
still subjected to an up-or-down vote by the full chamber, the same electoral,
partisan, and ideological considerations will pervade the process.
4. Internal Restraints in the Proposal
There are several restraints built into the proposal. It does not apply to
Supreme Court nominations-for two key reasons. First, the proposal is
intended to overcome the delays and obstructionism of the judicial confirmation
process. With Supreme Court nominations, the Senate acts. 123 Indeed, there are
mechanisms in place to ensure that a Supreme Court nomination receives full
consideration from the Senate. 124 Moreover, the attention associated with such a
nomination means that Senate inaction would be scrutinized just as publicly as
Senate action. Put simply, the facts do not support the idea that there is a
problem that requires the same type of fix as lower court confirmation
processes. Second, the nature and importance of Supreme Court nominations
make it impossible to imagine the Senate adopting a Commission-like proposal
for the confirmation of a justice. The Senate's advice and consent responsibility
is at its greatest when dealing with a nomination to the nation's highest court.
As such, even if there are flaws in the current approach to confirming Supreme
12 3 Kmiec & Mincberg, supra note 69, at 242.
1241d
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Court justices, the fact remains that it is a process that should be completed in
its entirety by senators.
The Confirmation Commission also only kicks in when the President
nominates an individual from the Selection Panel list and when the Senate
Judiciary Committee or full Senate fails to act in a timely fashion. Why these
limits? In the former instance, as mentioned above, the Selection Panel
requirement exists to balance out the Senate's reduced consenting role. The fact
that the Confirmation Commission mechanism only takes effect when the
Senate fails to act is a tacit acknowledgement that the preferred confirmation
process is through the normal procedures of Judiciary Committee consideration
and full Senate action. There is no reason to turn to the Confirmation
Commission if the Senate is functioning and fulfilling its advice and consent
responsibilities. Only in the face of delays and obstruction should an alternative
route to confirmation be available. Additionally, both limits on the use of the
Confirmation Commission serve as additional protections against a president
exploiting the Confirmation Commission mechanism to show favoritism or
promote ideological extremists to the judiciary. The Selection Panels will be
tasked with identifying only the most qualified candidates for appointment, and
their use in over a dozen states suggests that they can live up to that expectation.
Moreover, the Senate can always act within the requisite time frame to reject a
nominee that it opposes.
Having laid out the concept and the purposes it serves, it is time to defend
the proposal more directly. The next three Parts do just that. First, I explain why
the history of the Appointments Clause and the confirmation process support
the recommended changes. I then turn to the question of whether the Senate
can, constitutionally, adopt such an approach in fulfilling its advice and consent
role. Finally, I discuss why the political context of judicial confirmations would
not prevent-and may even encourage-the Senate's adopting the proposed
changes. In short, the confirmation process reform proposal is historically,
legally, and politically justified.
IV. WHY THE REFORM PROPOSAL WORKS: HISTORICALLY
With the suggested reforms now fully spelled out, it is time to anticipate,
and respond to, the chief complaints the proposal will provoke.
The first critique to contend with is that the proposal does not comport with
the historical understanding of the Senate's advice and consent role. Or, put
simply, the Framers would disapprove. Many scholars argue that the Senate was
supposed to have a powerful, active role in the judicial appointments process.' 25
Those holding this opinion will undoubtedly object to the diminished role that
the Confirmation Commission would mean for the upper chamber. Others,
125 See, e.g., Reynolds, supra note 69, at 1580; Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 70, at
1493-94.
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however, contend just the opposite. 126 They believe that the Framers intended
the Senate to serve only a limited function and to defer to the President except
in the most unwarranted of appointments. 127 A look at the Constitutional
Convention's adoption of the Appointments Clause helps answer the question
as to the intended role of the Senate. What that history reveals is that, like most
questions before the Convention, the delegates were split over the Senate's role,
but not over the ultimate purposes behind the Clause, which was to ensure that
the federal judiciary would be filled with qualified, meritorious judges.
Therefore, even though the Appointments Clause's history at the Convention is
a bit muddled, a thorough look at it reveals that the proposed reforms to the
confirmation process actually help meet the Framers' objectives.
There is a second history-related critique that also requires a response. It is
that the proposal represents a radical departure from the way in which the
Senate has gone about its advice and consent role for over two centuries. As
will be discussed later in this Part, there is truth to this critique, but it is
nonetheless misleading. It is accurate that the Senate has never taken the
approach to confirming judicial nominees that this Article proposes, but the
history of the Senate confirmation process shows that the notion of what
constitutes "advice and consent" and the manner in which the Senate has
fulfilled this function has changed repeatedly over the past 230 years. History,
then, is on the side of the proposal.
A. Advice and Consent at the Constitutional Convention
The reason commentators offer starkly different assessments of the Senate's
proper role in the judicial appointments process is attributable to the fact that
the historical record is ambiguous. Over the course of the Constitutional
Convention, the delegates proposed, debated, and voted on a variety of
appointment schemes. 128 The starting position, as proposed in the Virginia Plan,
was for the legislature to select the national judiciary. 129 Of course, when the
delegates adopted the Virginia Plan as the framework from which to build, it
was unclear what the legislature would look like, too.130 The delegates began
126 See, e.g., JOSEPH P. HARRIS, THE ADvICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE: A STUDY OF
THE CONFIRMATION OF APPOINTMENTS BY THE UNITED STATES SENATE 376 (1968); Eastman,
supra note 75, at 646-47; Pickering & Clanton, supra note 29, at 810-11; James E. Gauch,
Comment, The Intended Role of the Senate in Supreme Court Appointments, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 337, 338 (1989) (quoting several senators who themselves believed the chamber should
play a limited role in judicial appointments).
127 Eastman, supra note 75, at 640-47.
128 Gauch, supra note 126, at 341 ("Any analysis of the intent behind 'advice and
consent' is complicated by the divergent appointment schemes considered by the delegates
to the Constitutional Convention of 1787.").
1291 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 21 (Max Farrand ed.,
1911) [hereinafter RECORDs].
130 1d. at 20. The Virginia Plan called for a bicameral legislature, but did not specify the
details for the two chambers. Id.
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paying attention to the question of the judiciary on June 5, 1787, with a series of
conflicting proposals. 131 James Madison proposed that the Senate, not the
legislature as a whole, appoint judges.' 32 Other delegates disliked the idea of
legislative involvement in the appointment of judges, instead proposing that the
executive appoint members of the judiciary. 133 In response, Alexander
Hamilton "suggested the idea of the Executive's appointing or nominating the
Judges to the Senate which should have the right of rejecting or approving."' 134
A month later, Nathaniel Gorham formally proposed the Senate's "advice and
consent" role, though the motion failed on a tie vote. 135
As the Philadelphia summer grew hotter, so did tempers at the Convention
as the delegates focused on the most divisive question: how to apportion
representation in the Senate.' 36 Only after bitter debates 137 and significant
acquiescence on the part of large state delegates resulted in the Connecticut
Compromise would the Convention return to the issue of how federal judges
should be selected. But, of course, the Connecticut Compromise resulted in a
Senate equally represented by states, thereby changing the landscape when
deciding how to appoint judges. Thus, the delegates largely began debating the
matter anew.
Those debates, taking place generally between July 18 and September 7,
reveal three key considerations that lay at the heart of the appointments
question. Who best to assess the qualifications of judges? 138 How to avoid
corruption and intrigue in the selection process? 139 And lingering-always
lingering-was the concern for protecting states' interests. 140
As to the first matter-who best to assess the -merits of a judicial
candidate-the delegates were squarely split into two camps. Many voiced the
13 1 Id at 119-25.
132Id. at 120.
133 See, e.g., id at 119, 126, 244.
134 1d. at 128.
135 2 RECORDS, supra note 129, at 44.
136 MAx FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 94
(1913); 1 GEORGE H. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES: ITS HISTORY AND
PRACTICE 5 (1938).
137 See 1 RECORDS, supra note 129, at 492 (quoting Madison's notes of the statement by
Gunning Bedford of Delaware that if the small States did not receive equal representation in
the Senate, they would find "some foreign ally of more honor and good faith, who will take
them by the hand and do them justice"). John Dickinson, also of Delaware, agreed, stating
that "we would sooner submit to a foreign power, than be deprived of an equality of
suffrage, in both branches of the legislature." Id. at 242. Gouvemeur Morris of Pennsylvania
responded, "If persuasion does not unite [the country], the sword will." Id. at 530. Other
scholars have also noted that the disagreement over the composition of the Senate "was so
violent that it threatened to break up the Convention." ROY SWANSTROM, THE UNITED
STATES SENATE 1787-1801: A DISSERTATION ON THE FIRST FOURTEEN YEARS OF THE UPPER
LEGISLATIVE BODY, S. Doc. No. 87-64, at 14 (1961).
13 8 Gauch, supra note 126, at 342-43.
1391. at 343-46.
140Id. at 346-47.
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view that the Senate, as newly constituted, was best able to weigh the
qualifications of potential judges. Roger Sherman, for example, stated that the
Senate would have "more wisdom" than the Executive and would "bring into
their deliberations a more diffusive knowledge of characters." 14 1 Many
delegates concurred with that assessment. 142 Others, however, remained
unconvinced. 143 James Madison said that many legislators would be
"incompetent Judges of the requisite qualifications" for members of the
judiciary. 144
There was also no consensus among the delegates as to whether the
President or the Senate would be better suited to guard against the corrupting
influence often associated with the power to appoint. Of course, those who
favored the Senate appointing judges thought that the chamber was the more
secure choice. Sherman argued, "It would be less easy for candidates to intrigue
with [Senators], than with the Executive Magistrate."' 145 Those preferring
executive appointment suggested just the opposite. Nathaniel Gorham said that
placing the appointment power with the Senate would "give full play to intrigue
[and] cabal,"' 146 while James Wilson suggested Senate appointments of judges
would lead to "[i]ntrigue, partiality, and concealment." 147 Further driving the
debates were the delegates' views on how to construct an appointment system
that would protect state interests 148 and that would offer some form of
accountability in the choices made for filling the judiciary. 149
Ultimately, with these concerns in mind, the delegates adopted the
mechanism we know today: the President shall appoint judges with the advice
and consent of the Senate. 150 The provision that became the Appointments
Clause was proposed by the Committee of Eleven on September 4 and finally
adopted on September 7.151
Unfortunately, the compromises that brought about the Appointments
Clause are "not preserved in the record of the Federal Convention." 152 Some
have labeled the Convention debates over the appointments power as nothing
141 2 RECORDS, supra note 129, at 43.
142 See, e.g., id. at 81 (statement of Pinkney); id. at 82 (statement of Elbridge Gerry).
143 See, e.g., id. at 82 (statement of Gouverneur Morris).
144 1 ia. at 232.
145 2 id. at 43; see also id. (statement of Gunning Bedford).
146Id. at 42.
147 1 RECORDS, supra note 129, at 119.
1482 id. at 82 (statement of Elbridge Gerry).
149THE FEDERALIST No. 77, at 443 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009)
(discussing the public's ability to hold the President accountable for a bad nomination and
the Senate accountable for rejecting a good nomination).
150 U.S. CONST. art. 1I, § 2.
1512 RECORDS, supra note 129, at 494-95, 539. The Convention established the
Committee of Eleven to address issues tabled or not yet acted on by the delegates. Id. at 473.
The Committee was composed of one delegate from each state at the Convention. Id.
152 Theodore Y. Blumoff, Separation of Powers and the Origins of the Appointment
Clause, 37 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1037, 1069 (1987).
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more than "an unprincipled struggle over the proper allocation of powers" and
as motivated by "partisan politics and unguided practical necessity. ' 153 It is also
easy to see how scholars can take the Convention history of the Appointments
Clause and construct two diametrically opposed views of the Senate's
appropriate role in the confirmation process. Those who support a more
involved role for the chamber point out that for most of the Convention the
legislature alone would appoint judges. 154 Commentators who seek a more
deferential, hands-off approach by the Senate when considering judicial
nominations believe that the Framers only included the chamber in the process
to prevent the appointment of "political hacks."'155
But in many ways, this scholarly debate is missing the substance that gives
the inquiry meaning. The key consideration is not what the Framers intended
the Senate's role to be in the appointments process vis-A-vis the President. The
Convention history cannot answer that question satisfactorily for two reasons.
First, as noted above, the debates are inconclusive precisely because there was
no consensus. Second, and more importantly, what does exist of the historical
record is misleading. For much of the Convention the delegates did not know
what the national legislature would look like, how it would be constructed, and
what powers it would hold. Therefore, simply noting that the Framers originally
placed the responsibility of appointing judges with the legislature is less
meaningful than it might otherwise appear.
Additionally, as the delegates debated the question of giving the
appointment power to the Senate or the President, their discussion evidences a
governing worldview vastly different than our reality today. The Framers
worked under the assumption that the operating dynamic between the Executive
and the Senate would be one of institutional competition 56-each serving as a
check on the other-with the Framers giving little consideration to political
parties and ideological loyalties. 157 Today, this hardly holds true. More
important than an officeholder's station in government is her party affiliation. A
Republican-controlled Senate is generally unwilling to serve as a strong
institutional check on a Republican President, and the same is true for
Democratic Senates and Democratic Presidents. 158 This reality dramatically
153Id at 1078.
154 See, e.g., Strauss & Sunstein, supra note 70, at 1496-98.
155 John S. Baker, Jr., Ideology and the Confirmation of Federal Judges, 43 S. TEX. L.
REV. 177, 187 (2001).
156 Daryl J. Levinson & Richard H. Pildes, Separation of Parties, Not Powers, 119
HARV. L. REv. 2312, 2312 (2006) ("American political institutions were founded upon the
Madisonian assumption of vigorous, self-sustaining political competition between the
legislative and executive branches.").
157 Id. at 2312-13.
158 See id. at 2233-34; see also HENRY WAXMAN WITH JOSHUA GREEN, THE WAXMAN
REPORT: How CONGRESS REALLY WORKS 151-52 (2009) (explaining that Republicans were
uninterested in serving as a check against executive power during President George W.
Bush's terms).
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affects the advice and consent calculus as the Senate no longer necessarily
operates as the "security" 159 against a President's appointment power. Finally,
of course, with the Seventeenth Amendment's 160 ratification and the country's
growth, the Senate that the delegates created is materially different than that
today. State legislatures no longer appoint senators and the chamber has grown
from twenty-six members to one hundred.
Given all this, what can we make of the Convention history surrounding the
Appointments Clause as it relates to the proposed reforms discussed in Part II?
In examining the debates, it is easy to focus on the delegates' disagreements.
But behind the dissension rested a common understanding of the goals for
whatever appointment process the Convention adopted. The delegates wanted
judges whose merits, rather than political considerations, qualified them for
service. 161 It was with that objective always in mind that the Framers struggled
with the appropriate roles that the President and Senate should play. Therefore,
the proper means of assessing the proposed reforms against the historical record
is not to consider whether the proposal improperly dilutes the Senate's role in
the confirmation process. 162 Instead, the most meaningful question is whether
the proposal promotes the objective the Framers had for giving the Senate its
advice and consent responsibility. That goal, in a nutshell, was to prevent the
appointment of unqualified judges. 163
The Senate could be relied upon to do this because of its small size, 164 its
interest in promoting the national good, 165 its indirect attachment to popular
opinion,166 and the fact that senators would still feel a sense of accountability
because the "censure of rejecting a good [nominee] would lie entirely at the
door of the Senate. '167
159 2 RECORDS, supra note 129, at 42-43 (statement of James Madison).
160 U.S. CONST. amend. XVII.
161 See supra notes 137-39 and accompanying text.
1621 will later explain why the proposal should not be viewed as diminishing the
Senate's role in the confirmation process. See infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text.163 THE FEDERALIST No. 76, at 437 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009) ("It is
not easy to conceive a plan better calculated than this to produce a judicious choice of men
for filling the offices of the Union ... ").
164 1d. (discussing the value of "concurrence" by an "assembly of a moderate number");
I RECoRDs, supra note 129, at 233 (statement of James Madison).165 See, e.g., 2 RECORDS, supra note 129, at 292 ("The Senate was to represent &
manage the affairs of the whole, and not to be the advocates of State interests." (quoting
Daniel Carrol)); 2 THE FOUNDERS' CONsTITuTION 229 (Phillip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner
eds., 1987) (speaking before the New York ratifying convention, Alexander Hamilton said
that a senator "is an agent for the Union, and.., is bound to perform services necessary to
the good of the whole").
166 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; see also THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 362-63 (James Madison)
(Am. Bar Ass'n 2009) (discussing the importance of the indirect election of senators); 1
RECORDS, supra note 129, at 421.167 THE FEDERALIST No. 77, supra note 149, at 444.
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As discussed in Part II, the current approach to judicial confirmations
hardly meets these objectives. Senators are not motivated by institutional
considerations, but are instead driven by partisan, electoral, and ideological
concerns. 168 With judicial vacancy rates alarmingly high, 169 it is not clear that
national interests weigh heavily on senators' minds when considering judicial
nominees. Finally, because there is not material benefit to confirming judicial
nominees but often electoral advantages to delaying or obstructing
confirmation, the system has been perverted to incentivize stalemate in the
advice and consent process.
The proposal, therefore, meets the objectives of the Framers by returning
the focus to ensuring the confirmation of meritorious judicial nominees. The
Commission would thoroughly investigate a nominee's qualifications-against
standards designed by the Senate-and then base its decision on those factors
that help assess judicial merit rather than on the political considerations that
senators focus on today. While the proposal cannot change the incentives that
exist for a senator to seek to delay or block a judicial nomination for political
gain, the proposal reverses the vetogates of the legislative process so that once a
nominee has been found to be objectively qualified for the position, it will be
nearly impossible for a senator to prevent the Senate's consent. Finally, as
others have noted, implicit in the Appointments Clause rests the idea that the
"Senate will be proficient at making confirmation decisions." 170 The proposal
helps makes this assumption a reality.
B. Advice and Consent's Mutability
The second anticipated historical critique of the proposal is that it does not
comport with how the Senate has traditionally fulfilled its advice and consent
role. This concern is inaccurate, accurate, and irrelevant all at the same time.
In what respect is the critique inaccurate? As noted in Part III's detailed
description of the proposal, the advice feature of the proposal builds on formal
and informal mechanisms through which senators advise the President in the
judicial selection process. 171 Indeed, senators have used selection panels for
decades to offer slates of candidates from which the President nominates district
court appointees. 172 Moreover, when the President does select from
recommendations made by home state senators, it reduces the likelihood of
obstruction and delay. 173 While it is true that the proposal includes creating
168 Binder & Maltzman, supra note 16, at 306-10.
169 See Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 3.
170 Gerhardt, supra note 14, at 478.
171 See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
172 Id
1 7 3 See DENIS STEVEN RuTKus, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RE 34405, ROLE OF HOME
STATE SENATORS IN THE SELECTION OF LOWER FEDERAL COURT JUDGES 47-50 (2008),
available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL34405.pdf (discussing the consequences of
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selection panels for circuit court vacancies and formalizes the fast-track
approach for nominees selected from the submitted list, this is not a serious
departure from past experience.
It is, however, accurate to point to the creation of a Confirmation
Commission and the binding feature of the fast-track provision as an entirely
new way for the Senate to fulfill its consent function. 174 But this, then, gets to
the point about irrelevance. While it is true that the proposal represents a
different way for the Senate to confirm judicial nominees, the fact is that the
Senate has often developed new approaches to advising and consenting. Indeed,
the understanding of the Advice and Consent Clause has been quite mutable,
evolving over time. 175 For example, over the years, the norms of senatorial
courtesy in the judicial nomination process have been formalized through blue
slips. 176 Beginning in 1917, blue slips were sent to home state senators for all
judicial nominations. 177 For the first forty years, if a senator withheld a blue
slip, the "committee would report the nominee adversely to the Senate, where
the contesting Senator would have the option of stating his/her objections to the
nominee before the Senate would vote on confirmation."' 178 Between 1956 and
1978, that power extended even further so that one Senator "could stop all
committee action on a judicial nominee by either returning a negative blue slip
or failing to return a blue slip to the committee." 179 Since 1979, the importance
of blue slips has been left to the Judiciary Committee Chair to decide. 180
More specifically, Senate Judiciary Committee procedures for considering
nominations have changed over time. Of course, the Committee itself was not
established until 1816181 and it was not until 1868 that the Senate began
requiring all judicial nominations to be referred to the Committee. 182
Confirmation hearings did not occur regularly until the twentieth century, and
only then for Supreme Court nominations. 18 3 No nominee was called to testify
at a hearing until 1925, when Harlan Fiske Stone was invited to appear in
person to respond to questions about his role as Attorney General during the
nominating judicial candidates against the advice of, or without consulting, a home state
senator).174 Though it is not a new mechanism for dealing with stalemate. See Teter, supra note
7, at 3.17 5 Denning, supra note 69, at 27.
17 6 MITCHELL A. SOLLENBERGER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 32013, THE HISTORY OF
THE BLUE SLIP IN THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 1917-PREsENT, at 1-2 (2003).
177 Id. at 5.
1781d. at ii.
17 9 Id.
180 Id. at 10-21 (describing the blue slip practices of Judiciary Committee chairs).
18 1 History of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/about/history/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 1,
2012).
1821d
"183 Id.
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Teapot Dome Scandal. 184 Finally, until 1929, the Senate's deliberations on
judicial nominations were closed to the public and largely unrecorded. 185
These examples help make two important points. First, rather than static,
the process for the Senate to consent to judicial nominees is often changing.
Second, this history shows that the Senate has the unbridled authority to give
constitutional meaning to "advice and consent." In other words, the Senate has
always determined what it means to "consent" to a judicial nominee and the
proposal is only a new step in the evolving practices through which the Senate
fulfills that responsibility.
One final point deserves attention. The critique that the proposal distorts
some common historical understanding of how the Senate should consent to
judicial nominations is undermined by the fact that there is no uniform standard
by which individual senators decide how or why to consent. Some senators
express deference to presidential selections 186 while others do not. 187 Some wait
until after the Senate Judiciary Committee completes its hearings to make a
decision 188 while others announce support or opposition well before any
confirmation hearing. 189 Some senators (claim to) base their decision on
professional qualifications alone and eschew considerations of ideology. 190
Others gladly acknowledge the role that ideology plays in their decisions. 191
Indeed, the Senate Judiciary Committee has held hearings on the question of
what factors the Senate should consider when weighing judicial nominations. 192
These hearings show that there has never been consensus on that subject. In
1841d
185 BETSY PALMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RE 31948, EVOLUTION OF THE SENATE'S
ROLE IN THE NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION PROCESS: A BRIEF HISTORY 10 (2009).1 8 6 See, e.g., Orrin G. Hatch, The Constitution as the Playbook for Judicial Selection, 32
HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1035, 1040 (2009).187 See, e.g., Should Ideology Matter?, supra note 27, at 11-13 (statement of Sen.
Russell D. Feingold).188 See, e.g., Thomas Ferraro, Early Critic of Sotomayor Says Will Back Her, REUTERS,
July 22, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.corn/article/2009/O7/22/us-usa-court-
sotomayor-idUSTRE56L65G20090722.
189 See, e.g., Bob Egelko, Feinstein Blasts GOP Foes of Obama's Choice for Judge, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 16, 2010, at A12 (describing opposition to Ninth Circuit nominee Goodwin
Liu). Senators sometimes even announce opposition moments after the nomination is made.
See, e.g., ETHAN BRONNER, BATrLE FOR JUSTICE: How THE BORK NOMINATION SHOOK
AMERICA 84-85 (1989) (quoting Senator Edward M. Kennedy's speech opposing Robert
Bork's confirmation given moments after President Reagan announced Bork's nomination).
190 See, e.g., Should Ideology Matter?, supra note 27 at 13-14 (statements of Sen. Jon
Kyl); id. at 29-39 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
191 See, e.g., id. at 1-3 (statement of Sen. Charles E. Schumer); id at 11-13 (statement
of Sen. Russell D. Feingold). One former senator has said that he sometimes asked judicial
nominees about which charities they donated to over the past ten years and that, "if [he]
were still a member of the Senate [he] might use that more often." Selecting Federal Judges:
The Role and Responsibilities of the Legislative Branch, 86 JUDICATURE 28, 29 (2002)
(statement of Sen. Howard M. Metzenbaum).192 See, e.g., Should Ideology Matter?, supra note 27.
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other words, the Senate lacks any standard for deciding when a nominee
deserves confirmation.
The history makes clear, then, that there has never been a single, uniform
method for how or why the Senate consents to judicial nominations. It is
therefore irrelevant in assessing the proposal's merits that it does not comport
entirely with any past way the Senate has fulfilled that function.
The two history-based critiques of the proposal-that it violates the
Framers' intended role for the Senate and that it does not square with historical
practices-fail. Indeed, the Constitutional Convention history of the Advice and
Consent Clause reveals that the proposal actually bolsters the Framers'
objectives for the Appointments Clause by returning the judicial confirmation
process's focus to the qualifications of the nominee.
V. WHY THE REFORM PROPOSAL WORKS: CONSTITUTIONALLY
The confirmation reform proposal works from a historical perspective, as
the previous Part shows. That is an important consideration, of course, but it is
not the most significant critique the Senate would face in implementing the
proposal. The Senate would also need to overcome questions about the
mechanism's constitutionality. In this realm, two concerns arise. First, may the
Senate rely on rulemaking power to affect such a change in the judicial process?
Then, more substantively, does the use of a Confirmation Commission and
Selection Panels fulfill the chamber's responsibility under Article II to give
"advice and consent" to judicial appointments? This second concern breaks
down into two distinct considerations: whether Article II permits the Senate to
consent to nominees through the proposed method and also whether the use of a
Confirmation Commission violates any other implied constitutional standards,
such as the nondelegation doctrine or separation of powers. This Part will
explain why the proposal overcomes each of these concerns. Moreover, as I will
discuss, the political question doctrine further shields the suggested changes
from judicial scrutiny.
A. Can the Senate Use Its Rulemaking Authority to Enact the Reform?
Would a Senate rule reforming the confirmation process violate the
Constitution? To answer that, it is important to understand from where the
Senate derives its power to create any rule and how the Court has interpreted
that power.
Article I, Section 5 provides that "[e]ach House may determine the Rules of
its Proceedings."' 93 This broad provision, inserted by the Committee of Detail
on August 6, 1787,194 is "an unmistakable delegation by the Constitution to the
193 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
1942 REcORDs, supra note 129, at 180.
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House and Senate to devise their own enactment processes."'195 The
Constitution establishes no specific limits to this general rulemaking authority,
thereby granting the Senate "vast power" to adopt rules that it sees fit. 196 For
example, under the Rules of Proceedings prerogative of each chamber, the
Senate has created the Senate Special Committee on Aging' 97 and established
procedures governing the transition of staff who worked for a senator who
resigned or died in office, 198 while the House has created the House Democracy
Partnership to work with emerging democracies throughout the world.199 More
notably, of course, the Senate has adopted rules relating to its advice and
consent responsibilities. 200 Indeed, just recently, the Senate adopted a
resolution20 1 designed to "curb its own power" and to make the Senate "more
efficient" in its consideration of certain executive branch nominations.20 2
The expansive power the Senate has historically exercised under its
rulemaking authority supports the fast-tracking element of the suggested
reforms. That said, the proposal takes things one step further by establishing a
Confirmation Commission to review stalled judicial nominations and by
authorizing the creation of circuit-based judicial selection panels. The question
remains, therefore, could the Senate create these independent panels through a
simple, unicameral resolution?
Admittedly, there are no examples of such an important commission being
established exclusively by one chamber of Congress. 203 That said, the idea of
creating policy commissions to tackle entrenched problems is not new.204
Moreover, senators have created their own versions of nominating commissions
to assist in the selection of federal judges20 5 and have formed other advisory
groups as they have seen fit.20 6 Additionally, the Senate regularly passes
195 John C. Roberts, Are Congressional Committees Constitutional?: Radical
Textualism, Separation of Powers, and the Enactment Process, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REv.
489, 527 (2001).
196 Bruhl, supra note 107, at 345.
19 7 See S. Res. 4, 104, 95th Cong. (1977). The Special Committee on Aging has no
legislative authority, but studies issues, conducts oversight, and investigates reports of fraud
and abuse. Id.
198 S. Res. 458, 98th Cong. (1984).
199 H.R. Res. 5, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. Res. 135, 109th Cong. (2005).
2 0 0 STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE R. XXXI, in CoMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., U.S.
SENATE, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND
RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE U.S. SENATE, S. DOC. No. 112-1, at 57-59
(2011).
201 S. Res. 116, 112th Cong. (2011).
202 Chuck Schumer, Nominations Reform Will Change the Senate for the Good, THE
HILL'S CONGRESS BLOG (June 29, 2011, 10:11 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-
blog/politics/168997-nominations-reform-will-change-the-senate-for-the-good.
203Telephone Interview with Robert B. Dove, Former Parliamentarian, U.S. Senate
(1981-1987, 1995-2001) (June 29, 2011).2 04 See GLASSMAN & STRAus, supra note 111, at 1.
2 05 See supra notes 112-22 and accompanying text.
2 06 See GLASSMAN & STRAus, supra note 111, at 1.
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resolutions related to the hiring of Senate staff, the organization of the Senate,
and other administrative matters. These precedents, especially taken together,
affirm the idea that the Senate could create a Confirmation Commission and
Selection Panels to help it complete its advice and consent responsibilities.207
Supreme Court precedent provides further legitimacy to the proposal. Few
Supreme Court cases directly address the Rules of Proceedings Clause and
those that do generally focus not on the breadth of the rulemaking power, but
instead on interpreting an existing rule. The Court decided perhaps the most
important of these cases in 1892. In United States v. Ballin, petitioners
challenged a House of Representatives rule that allowed the presiding officer to
count toward a quorum those members physically present but who did not
vote.20 8 Specifically, petitioners questioned the legality of a tariff statute that
passed by a vote of 138 in favor, 3 opposed, and 189 present but not voting.209
In framing the issue, the Court stated, "The action taken was in direct
compliance with [the] rule. The question, therefore, is as to the validity of this
rule ... ."210 The Court then went on to articulate a strong presumption in
support of Congress's rulemaking authority. The Court held:
The Constitution empowers each house to determine its rules of
proceedings... [i]t is no impeachment of the rule to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate, or even more just. It is no objection to the
validity of a rule that a different one has been prescribed and in force for a
length of time.211
The Court did place some limits on the power, stating that Congress "may
not by its rules ignore constitutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and
there should be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and the result which is sought to be
attained. '212 But the rulemaking power, within these limits, is "absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body or tribunal. 213
I will explain below why the proposal does not implicate any of the
articulated restraints on the Senate's rulemaking power, but it is enough at this
point to say that the Court articulated in Ballin an expansive authority for
Congress in adopting rules. Since Ballin, there have been only a few instances
207 Indeed, former Senate Parliamentarian Robert Dove confirmed that such a
Commission would be "well within" the Senate's rulemaking power. See Telephone
Interview with Robert B. Dove, supra note 203.
208 144 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1892).
209 Id.
2 10 1d. at 5.
211Id.
212Id.
2 13 Id.
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of the Court weighing a challenge to a congressional rule.214 In most of these
instances, moreover, the case focused on congressional interpretation of, or
failure to abide by, a rule-not on the legitimacy of the rule itself.215
One such case, United States v. Smith, deserves special attention as it deals
specifically with a Senate rule relating to its advice and consent role.216 In 1930,
President Hoover nominated George Otis Smith to join the Federal Power
Commission.217 Less than three weeks later, on December 20, the Senate
advised and consented to the nomination by a vote of thirty-eight to twenty-two,
with thirty-five senators not voting.2 18 That same day, the Senate ordered that
the resolution confirming Smith be forwarded to the President and then the
chamber adjourned to January 5, 1931.219 On December 22, 1930, the Secretary
of the Senate forwarded the confirmation resolution, whereupon the President
signed it and it was delivered to Smith.220 That same day, Smith took the oath
of office, seemingly completing the nomination and appointment process. 221
From the Senate's standpoint, however, nothing was final. Under Senate rules, a
"Senator voting in the majority [could] move for a reconsideration of [the
nomination] on the same day on which the vote was taken, or on either of the
next two days of actual executive session of the Senate." 222 If the
reconsideration resulted in the rejection of an otherwise approved nomination,
and the confirmation had not yet been forwarded to the President, then the
reconsideration would take effect, and the appropriate notice would be sent to
the President.223 But if the Senate had already forwarded the confirmation
notification, then the Senate would send the President a copy of the
reconsideration resolution along with a request that the President return the
confirmation notification to the Senate.224
On January 5, 1931, sixteen days after initially consenting to Smith's
nomination and two weeks after Smith formally joined the Federal Power
Commission-but still the next day of the Senate's executive session because of
2 14 See Roberts, supra note 195, at 530 (stating that "[f]ederal courts have only
infrequently had the opportunity to interpret the Rulemaking Clause of Article I, Section 5"
and providing a summary of the relevant case law).
215See, e.g., Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109, 114 (1963) ("It is against this
background that the Committee's failure to comply with its own rules must be judged.");
Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84, 88-89 (1949) ("The question is neither what rules
Congress may establish for its own governance, nor whether presumptions of continuity may
protect the validity of its legislative conduct. The question is rather what rules the House has
established and whether they have been followed.").
216286 U.S. 6, 8 (1932).
217 Id. at 27.
218 Id.
219Id.
22 0Id. at 27-28.
2 2 1 1d. at28.
222 Smith, 286 U.S. at 30-31.
2 2 3 Id. at 31.
224 Id
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the adjournment-the Senate adopted a motion to reconsider Smith's
nomination and notified President Hoover accordingly.225 Five days later,
President Hoover responded by informing the Senate that because he had
already appointed Smith to the Commission he would not return the
notification.226 The Senate nevertheless proceeded to reconsider Smith's
nomination and rejected it.227 The Senate then instituted legal proceedings to
test Smith's claim on his office.228
In deciding the matter, the Court never questioned the legitimacy of the rule
itself. Indeed, the Court went out of its way to make clear that the issue
"relate[d] to the construction of the applicable rules, not to their
constitutionality. '229 The Court then held that the Senate had incorrectly
construed the rule to require the President to return a nomination, even though
the rule only permitted the Senate to request the return.230 But even as the Court
construed the rule differently than the Senate, the Court reiterated the Ballin
deference, and stated: "The Constitution commits to the Senate the power to
make its own rules; and it is not the function of the Court to say that another
rule would be better." 231 With regards to the specific responsibility relating to
nominations, the Court concluded, "A rule designed to ensure due deliberation
in the performance of the vital function of advising and consenting to
nominations for public office, moreover, should receive from the Court the most
sympathetic consideration. '" 232
These cases, together, establish the prevailing principle that each chamber
of Congress has almost complete authority under the Rules of Proceedings
Clause to adopt any rule that it thinks is useful in carrying out its constitutional
functions.
B. Does the Substance of the Proposal Implicate Specific Constitutional
Provisions?
Could it be, however, that while the Senate enjoys the right to adopt rules
related to its advice and consent responsibilities, that the actual proposal itself
still violates the limits placed on Congress by Ballin? In other words, would the
proposal "ignore constitutional restraints," "violate fundamental rights," or lack
a "reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding established
by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained"?233
2 25 Id. at 27-28.
2261d
227/Id. at 29.
228 Smith, 286 U.S. at 29-30.
229Md. at 33.
230IM. at 43.
2 3 1 1d. at 48.
2 3 2 1d.
233 United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
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To answer this question requires a look at the substance of the proposal,
best done by examining the three elements of Ballin's limits in turn. Are there
any constitutional restraints on the Senate's advice and consent role that the
proposal ignores? As discussed in the previous section, the Framers did not
adorn the Appointments Clause with any special instructions, qualifications, or
guidance,234 leaving the Senate "free to develop, to [its] ... satisfaction, special
procedures for appointing different kinds of federal officers." 235 And a review
of the Constitution reveals no other clauses that might plausibly be read as a
restraint on the Senate's advice and consent role. We are left, then, with
scrutinizing Article II, Section 2 itself for possible restraints that the proposal
ignores.
The relevant clause of Article II, Section 2 states: "[The President] shall
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court,
and all other Officers of the United States .... ,"236 From this language two
possible limits arise. Is consent actually being given to those nominees that pass
through the proposed Commission mechanism and, perhaps more basically, is it
the Senate that is giving it? As I'll discuss later, the political question doctrine
probably precludes a court from ever attempting to answer these questions, 237
but even if a court were to inquire, it is difficult to imagine it concluding that
these two words serve as restraints that the proposal ignores.
After all, in Ballin, the issue centered on the House's definition of quorum.
The Constitution provides that "a Majority of each [house] shall constitute a
Quorum to do Business. '238 This, obviously, placed some restraint on Congress
from adopting a rule that formally redefined quorum to be fewer than a
majority. But the Court allowed the House to determine the presence of a
majority because the Constitution "has prescribed no method of making this
determination." 239 Similarly, the Constitution prescribes no particular method
for ascertaining the Senate's consent to a nomination. As such, the Senate
would not be ignoring any other restraint by adopting the Commission and fast-
track mechanism proposed in Part III.
The more recent case of Nixon v. United States240 further supports this
conclusion. That case features prominently in the later discussion regarding the
political question doctrine, but it also offers some insights here. In Nixon, the
Court weighed a petition by Walter Nixon, a former federal district court
judge.241 Following his conviction and sentencing to federal prison for making
false statements to a federal grand jury, the House of Representatives
234 Gerhardt, supra note 14, at 477.
235 Id.
236 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
237 See infra notes 271-94 and accompanying text.
238 U.S. CONST. art I, § 5, cl. 1.
239 United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 6 (1892).
240 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
241Id. at 226-28.
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impeached Nixon and forwarded the matter to the Senate.242 Under Rule XI, 24 3
a committee of senators heard evidence in the matter and then presented to the
full Senate a "transcript of the proceeding and a Report stating the uncontested
facts and summarizing the evidence on the contested facts."244 "Nixon and the
House impeachment managers submitted extensive final briefs to the full Senate
and delivered arguments from the Senate floor," and answered questions posed
directly by the senators. 245 Nixon was also permitted to offer a personal appeal
on the floor of the Senate. 246 After three hours of this oral argument, the Senate
voted by more than the requisite two-thirds to convict Nixon on two articles of
impeachment. 247 Nixon then brought suit, contending that Senate Rule Xl's
committee procedure for taking evidence violates the Constitution's
requirement that "the Senate. . . 'try' all impeachments. 248
Article I, Section 3 provides that: "The Senate shall have the sole Power to
try all Impeachments." 249 The Clause then goes on to place three requirements
on that power: (1) The Senate "shall be on Oath or Affirmation," (2) a two-
thirds vote is required to convict, and (3) "[wjhen the President of the United
242 Id.
243 The rule provides:
That in the trial of any impeachment the Presiding Officer of the Senate, if the
Senate so orders, shall appoint a committee of Senators to receive evidence and take
testimony at such times and places as the committee may determine, and for such
purpose the committee so appointed and the chairman thereof, to be elected by the
committee, shall (unless otherwise ordered by the Senate) exercise all the powers and
functions conferred upon the Senate and the Presiding Officer of the Senate,
respectively, under the rules of procedure and practice in the Senate when sitting on
impeachment trials.
Unless otherwise ordered by the Senate, the rules of procedure and practice in the
Senate when sitting on impeachment trials shall govern the procedure and practice of
the committee so appointed. The committee so appointed shall report to the Senate in
writing a certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings and testimony had and given
before such committee, and such report shall be received by the Senate and the evidence
so received and the testimony so taken shall be considered to all intents and purposes,
subject to the right of the Senate to determine competency, relevancy, and materiality,
as having been received and taken before the Senate, but nothing herein shall prevent
the Senate from sending for any witness and hearing his testimony in open Senate, or by
order of the Senate having the entire trial in open Senate.
RULES OF PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE IN THE SENATE WHEN SITTING ON IMPEACHMENT
TRIALS R. XI, in COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., U.S. SENATE, SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING
THE STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE
U.S. SENATE, S. Doc. No. 112-1, at 218 (2011).244 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 227.
245 Id. at 227-28.
24 6 d. at 228.247/d.
248 Id. (emphasis added).
249 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
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States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside." 250 Nixon argued that the use of
the word "try" in Article I, Section 3 imposes an obligation on the Senate to
conduct a "judicial trial" and that, either way, the authority granted in Article I,
Section 3, Clause 6 is to "the Senate"-meaning the full chamber, not a
committee created by it.251 The Court dismissed this logic quickly.252
Regarding "try," the Court established that the word has enjoyed "considerably
broader meanings" than just a judicial trial since the founding era.253 The Court
then addressed the second claim that relies on "the Senate" to mean the full
body. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, rejected the reading as
"possible," but "not... natural," and asserted that endorsing such an approach
"would bring into judicial purview not merely the sort of claim made by
petitioner, but other similar claims based on the conclusion that the word
'Senate' has imposed by implication limitations on procedures which the Senate
might adopt."'254 Based on this, and the political question doctrine, which Chief
Justice Rehnquist then discussed in detail, the Court denied Nixon's challenge
to his impeachment conviction.255
Just as the words "Senate" and "try" did not "provide an identifiable textual
limit" on the Senate's impeachment authority, and just as the House of
Representatives was free to establish its own preferred method for determining
the presence of a quorum in Ballin, the Constitution grants the Senate control
over determining the process for consenting to judicial nominees and no
constitutional restraint is implicated by the proposal.
The other two Ballin limits can be dealt with more quickly. First, the
proposed method of judicial confirmation cannot be said to "violate
fundamental rights." 256 Simply because someone is nominated for a judgeship
does not confer on that individual the right to appointment. Nor, as history has
shown, does it even confer the right to have the Senate take any action on the
nomination. As a practical matter, the proposed system for judicial confirmation
would result in one of two possible outcomes, but following different routes.
First, the Judiciary Committee and full Senate take up the nomination in a
timely manner and confirm or reject the nominee-either way, the new
procedure would not be implicated. Second, the nomination passes to the
Commission, which either recommends or disapproves confirmation. From
there, the Senate either endorses the recommendation or overturns it. In the
instances in which the Senate accepts a Commission's approval or overturns a
Commission disapproval and the nominee is confirmed, no injury results. For
those rejected by the Commission without contrary Senate action, the new
procedure still cannot be said to have resulted in a violation of a fundamental
2501d.; see also Nixon, 506 U.S. at 230.
251 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 229.
252 Id.
253 Id.
254Id. at 232.
255 Id. at 238.
256 United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892).
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right for two key reasons: it is still the Senate rejecting the nominee through its
adoption of the procedure and its failure to overturn the Commission's
recommendation and, moreover, if the individual cannot muster the necessary
sixty votes to overturn the Commission's recommendation it is doubtful that the
nomination could have secured the sixty votes necessary to move forward with
the Senate's consideration of the nomination. In other words, there is still no
cognizable injury, without which it is impossible to claim a violation of a
fundamental right. Unless a court is willing to recognize a nominee's right to a
vote by the full Senate-a right that would implicate the current system of
judicial confirmation-no fundamental rights would be violated by the
proposed system.
The final Ballin restriction requires that the "method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be attained" are
reasonably related.257 It is important to note that the question is not about the
reasonableness of the goal of the rule, but whether the method is reasonably
related to the end. Here, the end would be a more efficient, less politically
charged judicial confirmation process. Part II laid out the problems associated
with the current system and there is no need to repeat them.258 It is enough to
say that the proposed changes to the Senate's handling of judicial nominations
are reasonably related to the purpose of speedier, more efficient, and less
politically controlled confirmations.
Thus, it is fair to conclude that the proposal passes muster under the Ballin
standard.
C. Does the Proposal Offend Other Constitutional Norms?
A final concern remains, though, before turning to the political question
doctrine. Does the proposed use of a Confirmation Commission constitute an
improper delegation of the Senate's authority or upset in any other way the
constitutional separation of powers? The glib answer is that the nondelegation
doctrine is too long dead to pay it much concern.259 After all, it has been over
seventy years since the Court has struck down a legislative act as an improper
delegation.260 Moreover, even if nondelegation remained a vibrant doctrine, the
Court has already rejected a similar nondelegation claim. In Sibbach v. Wilson
& Co., 261 the Court upheld Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 35 and 37 and, in
2 5 7 d. at 5.
258 See supra notes 8-34 and accompanying text.
259 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 328-30
(3d ed. 2006) (discussing the "demise" of the nondelegation doctrine).260 See id. at 328 (citing Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)).
261 312 U.S. 1 (1941).
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so doing, validated the process through which those Rules were promulgated.262
Congress established the relevant mechanism in the Rules Enabling Act of
1934,263 another example of "recusal legislating. ' 264 Under that law, Congress
delegated to the Supreme Court the power to prescribe rules of civil
procedure. 265 The Court promulgates these rules through the Judicial
Conference, the administrative and policymaking body of the U.S. courts,
which in turn passes the rule-developing responsibility onto various advisory
committees. 266 Once the relevant committees and the Judicial Conference
approve a rule, the Supreme Court reviews the proposal. 267 The Supreme Court
then forwards accepted rules to Congress and the rule becomes effective unless
Congress acts otherwise.268 Thus, like the proposal, under the Rules Enabling
Act, another body's recommendations take effect in the case of congressional
inaction. Faced with this procedural mechanism, the Court in Sibbach held that
"Congress has undoubted power to regulate the practice and procedure of
federal courts, and may exercise that power by delegating to this or other
federal courts authority to make rules."269 Similarly, the Senate enjoys the
power to advise and consent to judicial nominees and can delegate a portion of
that responsibility to a Confirmation Commission.
But, more importantly, it is not clear that the proposal constitutes a
delegation of authority. The Senate is still advising and consenting to the
nomination by accepting the Confirmation Commission's recommendation and
then taking the additional step of forwarding the certificate of confirmation to
the President. While it is true that Senate inaction creates the opportunity for the
Commission's recommendation to take effect, the Senate still formally acts to
carry out its consent function. And, of course, it could always act, if it wished,
to disapprove the Commission's recommendation. Moreover, if a delegation
exists, it is to a Commission created and administered by the Senate. The
proposal does not transfer any duties to the executive or the judiciary, or even to
the other chamber of Congress. Thus, if it is a delegation, it is a self-delegation,
not materially different than passing authority to Senate committees.
No other separation of powers problem arises, either. Even if it could be
said that the Senate's influence is slightly diminished in its consenting capacity,
262Id. at 15-16 ("That no adverse action was taken by Congress indicates, at least, that
no transgression of legislative policy was found. We conclude that the rules under attack are
within the authority granted.").
263 Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(2006)).264 Teter, supra note 7, at 4-5.
265 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
266 1d. § 2073(b); Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, Federal Rulemaking: The
Rulemaking Process, a Summary for the Bench and Bar, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/FederalRulemaking/RulemakingProcess/Summa
ryBenchBar.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2012).
267 Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, supra note 266.
268 28 U.S.C. § 2074.
269 Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 9 (1941).
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that influence is made up for in the increased role the Senate would play in
advising on judicial nomination. Moreover, as the Supreme Court has stated,
"The structural interests protected by the Appointments Clause are not those of
any one branch of Government but of the entire Republic. '270 The structural
interests of the United States are promoted by an efficient mechanism for
securing Senate action on judicial nominations, thereby easing the vacancy
crisis of the court system.
D. The Political Question Doctrine's Shield
While each of the constitutional concerns discussed above can be overcome
on the merits, were the Senate to adopt the proposal, it would be insulated from
legal attack because of the political question doctrine.
The political question doctrine is a Supreme Court-created jurisdiction limit
on the federal judiciary's ability to decide matters that raise questions that
should be left to the politically accountable branches to decide. 271 Though the
principle at the doctrine's heart can be traced as far back as Marbury v.
Madison,272 the Court gave the idea its present meaning in Baker v. Carr, which
focused on the justiciabilty of claims related to malapportioned legislative
districts. 273 The Court identified six elements of a political question:
[(1)] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or [(2)] a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or [(3)] the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or [(4)] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or [(5)] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or [(6)] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.274
Since Baker, the Court has seldom found an issue nonjusticiable under the
political question doctrine. Indeed, only in Nixon v. United States did the Court
rely on the doctrine in reaching an outcome in the case.275 Despite the fact that
2 70 Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868, 880 (1991) (discussing the Appointments Clause
as it relates to tax court judges).
2 7 1 See CIEMERINSKY, supra note 259, at 129.
272 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 165-70 (1803) ("By the [C]onstitution of the United States,
the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he
is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character
and to his own conscience ... Questions, in their nature political, or which are by the
constitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in this court.").
273369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
2741d
"
275 506 U.S. 224, 226 (1993). The Court has come close to declaring claims of partisan
gerrymandering as nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine. See Vieth v.
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the political question doctrine "cease[s] to function as a meaningful
jurisdictional restraint, '276 with the present proposal, the Court would likely
follow the precedent established in Nixon and decline to exercise jurisdiction.
Two of the factors identified in Baker as establishing a political question
doctrine are of particular relevance here. First, the Constitution offers a
textually demonstrable commitment to the Senate of the issue of advising and
consenting to judicial nominations. Second, there is a lack of judicially
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving the question as to whether
the proposal fails to meet the Constitution's "advice and consent" command.
In Nixon, the Court held that the Constitution committed the issue of
impeachment to the Senate. 277 The basis for this decision rested primarily with
the "language and structure" 278 of the Impeachment Clause, which gave the
Senate "sole Power of Impeachment. '279 The Court took this to mean that "the
Senate alone shall have authority to determine whether an individual should be
acquitted or convicted. '280 If the Court were to review the impeachment
proceedings the Senate chose to use, the Senate would not enjoy sole
authority--"functioning independently and without assistance or
interference"-over impeachment trials.281
Additionally, the Court concluded that it lacked a judicially discoverable
and manageable standard for resolving the question of whether the
impeachment proceeding in Nixon's case met the Framers' intent.282 The Court
noted that the word "try" has "various" and "broader" meanings than simply to
conduct a judicial trial,283 Absent a clear statement at the nation's founding as
to what "try" required, the Court saw no discoverable standard for resolving the
matter.28
4
To buttress its holding, the Court turned to the history of the Impeachment
Clause, stating: "The parties do not offer evidence of a single word in the
history of the Constitutional Convention... that even alludes to the possibility
of judicial review in the context of the impeachment powers. '285 Moreover, the
Court noted that "[t]he Framers labored over the question of where the
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (The four-person plurality held that claims of partisan
gerrymandering are nonjusticiable. Justice Kennedy agreed with the plurality's conclusion in
the case before the Court, but refused to rule out the possibility for the judiciary to decide
future partisan gerrymandering claims.).
276 Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Judicial Review and the Political Question Doctrine: Reviving
the Federalist "Rebuttable Presumption" Analysis, 80 N.C. L. REv. 1165, 1167 (2002).
277 506 U.S. at 237-38.
278 1d. at 229.
279 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.
280 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 231.
28 1 Id. (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2168 (1971)).
282Id. at 230.
283 Id. at 229-30.
2 8 41d 
.285 Id. at 233.
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impeachment power should lie," 286 at one point even considering James
Madison's proposal to rest the power with the Supreme Court.287 Ultimately,
though, the Framers chose not to assign the judiciary a role in the impeachment
because to do otherwise would run the risk of bias by having impeachments
presided over by the same people who would oversee criminal trials. 288
Additionally, giving the judiciary a role in impeachment would upset the system
of checks and balances because impeachment is the legislature's check on the
judiciary branch. As the Court said, allowing the judiciary a role in
impeachment "would place final reviewing authority with respect to
impeachments in the hands of the same body that the impeachment process is
meant to regulate. '289 For each of these reasons, as well as concerns about a
lack of finality and the difficulty in fashioning relief, the Court relied on the
political question doctrine to conclude that the case was nonjusticiable. 290
The Court's reasoning in Nixon would control if an action were brought
challenging the proposal. Just like in the impeachment process, there can be no
doubt that the Senate enjoys sole responsibility for consenting to judicial
nominations. As discussed in Part IV, from the very first Congress, the
confirmation process has fallen exclusively under the Senate's domain.
Similarly, the lack of any clear constitutional history regarding the meaning of
the word "consent" and the subsequent mutable understanding of that term
make it impossible to discern a judicially discoverable standard to impose on
the Senate as it fulfills its consent responsibilities. Additionally, the ratification
history shows that the Advice and Consent Clause was one of the particular
provisions for which the Framers did not consider judicial review available.291
This makes sense because, like in the impeachment context, there is a specter of
a conflict of interest if the judiciary were to involve itself in the judicial
nomination process. Moreover, though impeachment may be the legislature's
only check over a judge once the individual is in office, the advice and consent
process does serve as a check on the judiciary as a whole. Allowing the
judiciary a role in reviewing the confirmation process would erode the checks
and balances of the system. Finally, much like the question of where to place
the impeachment power, the Framers struggled with the Appointments Clause,
until they concluded-in the Convention's final days-to give the President the
exclusive authority to nominate and the Senate the sole power to consent. 292
The political question doctrine is about ensuring compliance with the
Constitution's written limits. 293 The only defining restrictions in the
Appointments Clause are that the President "shall nominate" and the Senate
286 Nixon, 506 U.S. at 233.
2871d
"
288 THE FEDERALIST No. 65, at 377 (Alexander Hamilton) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009).
289Nixon, 506 U.S. at 235.
2901d. at 238.
291 Pushaw, Jr., supra note 276, at 1189-90.
292 See 2 RECORDS, supra note 129, at 539-40; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
293 Pushaw, Jr., supra note 276, at 1167-68.
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shall give "Advice and Consent. ' 294 Given the textual commitment to the
Senate of the responsibility to consent to judicial nominations and the lack of
any standards for assessing the merits of the Senate's determination as to the
appropriate process for fulfilling this command, no court is likely to conclude
that a challenge to the proposal is justiciable.
For all of these reasons, it is safe to assume that the proposal is
constitutionally sound.
VI. WHY THE REFORM PROPOSAL WORKS: POLITICALLY
To consider the question of whether, politically, the proposal enjoys any
real chance of enactment, it is helpful to break the discussion down by first
explaining why the general politics associated with the confirmation would
allow senators to support the proposal. Then, looking at the key elements of the
proposal itself, one sees a past willingness on the part of members of Congress
to employ many of the same tools to meet similar process-related problems.
That is not to say, of course, that there are no political obstacles standing in the
way of the proposal. Therefore, after explaining why the politics may encourage
the proposal's adoption, I will discuss the difficulties facing it, too.
A. Bipartisan Frustrations
Senators in both parties have expressed frustration with the judicial
confirmation process-and for good reason.295 The increase in delays,
obstruction, and ideological fights over judicial nominees has afflicted both
parties' Presidents. 296 At various points in the recent past, large numbers of
senators from both parties have decried the slow pace and unfortunate
consequences of Senate delay and inaction on judicial nominations.297
While many of the complaints might be empty rhetoric, much of it stems
from deep frustration with the current system. That dissatisfaction may leave
senators willing to try to find a suitable answer to the continued problems
associated with the confirmation process. Indeed, at the beginning of the most
recent Congress, Democratic senators made a push for considerable rules
reform that would have addressed, in part, how the Senate deals with its advice
294 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
295 See, e.g., Comyn, supra note 69; Patrick Leahy, Bipartisanship Needed to Resolve
the Vacancy Crisis in the Nation's Courts, THE HILL (Jan. 24, 2011, 8:01 PM),
http://thehill.com/special-reports/state-of-the-union-january-2011/139851-bipartisanship-
needed-to-resolve-the-vacancy-crisis-in-the-nations-courts.296 See supra notes 8-24 and accompanying text.
297 See Aaron-Andrew Bruhl, If the Judicial Confirmation Process Is Broken, Can a
Statute Fix It?, 85 NEB. L. REV. 960, 961 (2007) ("Republicans complain about Democratic
obstruction of nominations .... During the Clinton years, of course, Democrats railed
against alleged Republican abuses ....").
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and consent role.298 Then, Majority Leader Harry Reid and Minority Leader
Mitch McConnell struck an agreement aimed at reducing the number of
filibusters. 299 And just recently, the Senate enacted a reform package that
streamlined how it consented to many executive branch nominations. 300 These
are strong indications that senators are growing increasingly frustrated with how
the chamber deals with judicial confirmations and that there is real momentum
for a change in the process.
B. Known Knowns30 1
The growing frustration with the confirmation process adds another element
to the mix which makes the proposal more plausible. At some point, a majority
in the Senate will grow so fed up with the system that they will take unilateral
action to change it, despite the consequences. For example, as President Bush
faced fierce Democratic opposition to his judicial nominees, Senate
Republicans seriously considered invoking the "nuclear option" as a way to
advance his nominees. 302 Ultimately, a group of moderate senators, known as
the "Gang of Fourteen" reached a compromise that saved the Senate from self-
annihilation. 303
As mentioned briefly, the tables have turned once again and now Democrats
are the ones decrying the obstructionism and delay that has been increasingly
common. 304 If President Obama wins reelection in 2012 and the Democrats
retain a narrow majority in the Senate, it would not be surprising to hear calls
for something analogous to the "nuclear option."
298 Press Release, Sen. Tom Udall, Democratic Trio Remain Committed to Senate Rules
Reform (Jan. 26, 2011), available at http://tomudall.senate.gov/?p=pressrelease&id=75 1.299 See Carl Hulse, Senate Approves Changes Intended to Ease Gridlock, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 2011, at A20.
300 Josiah Ryan, Senate Clears Bill to Streamline Confirming Executive Nominees, THE
HILL (June 29, 2011, 12:31 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/senate/169013-senate-clears-
bill-to-steamline-confirming-nominees.
301 "[T]here are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there
are known unknowns; that is to say we know there are some things we do not know. But
there are also unknown unknowns-the ones we don't know we don't know." Michiko
Kakutani, Rumsfeld's Defense of Known Decisions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2011, at C25
(quoting former U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld).
302 Charles Babington & Dan Balz, Senate GOP Sets Up Filibuster Showdown, WASH.
POST, Apr. 22, 2005, at At. The nuclear option would have established a mechanism for
invoking cloture on judicial nominations by majority vote. See BETSY PALMER, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL 32684, CHANGING SENATE RULES OR PROCEDURES: THE
"CONSTITUTIONAL" OR "NUCLEAR" OPTION 2-4 (2005).
303 Carl Hulse, Bipartisan Group in Senate Averts Judge Showdown, N.Y. TIMES, May
24, 2005, at Al.304 See, e.g., Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Senate Should Hold Up-or-Down Votes
on Noncontroversial Judicial Nominees (Mar. 2, 2010), available at
http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/press-releases/release/?id=947918c9-d78a-4746-83 lb-
f99c9a9a9bcO.
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But senators might also seek a better, less destructive way out of the mess-
something more akin to nuclear disarmament than warfare. The proposal
presents the opportunity for the Senate to work out a process that addresses its
confirmation concerns on its own collective terms rather than through a
protracted fight that harms the institution. Unlike a rule change that is overtly
political and focused on achieving a specific desired partisan goal-as the
Republicans' "nuclear option" plan was in 2005-the proposal would be a more
detailed, process-oriented undertaking, one that would present opportunities for
compromise and could be written to reflect the concerns of senators across the
political spectrum. With a presidential election looming and control of the
Senate in question, the timing could be right for the Senate to put in place a
"known knowns" rather than wait for the next fierce confirmation battle that
could result in even more dramatic and unknown changes.
C. Senatorial Self-Interest
The previous point focused on the collective self-interest of the Senate, but
the proposal also offers individual senators incentives. First, it seems likely that
an overwhelming majority of senators want to fulfill their constitutional duties
responsibly and efficiently. 30 5 But that is only one consideration in a complex
set of goals and desires. As David Mayhew famously posited years ago, a
senator's primary objective is reelection. 30 6 Indeed, reelection overwhelms all
other considerations.30 7 Unfortunately, there is little to no perceived electoral
benefit to confirming judicial nominees.308 And that is the best-case scenario. In
many instances, electoral pressures incentivize delay and obstructionism, as
senators use their opposition to judicial nominees to fundraise, 309 motivate their
base supporters, 310 and appeal to interest groups.311 Additionally, judicial
nominations have become another bargaining chip for senators interested in
logrolling their way to preferred policy outcomes. 312
305 After all, the Constitution requires senators to take an oath to fulfill their
constitutional obligations. U.S. CONST. art. VI.3 0 6 DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 13 (1974).
3 0 7 Id. at 13, 81; see also BRUCE CAIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY
SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE 77 (1987); MORRIS P. FIORINA, CONGRESS:
KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 37 (2d ed. 1989).30 8 See, e.g., A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. Amsterdam, Legislative Control over Judicial
Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 10 (1958) (stating
that lawmakers are indifferent to the efficient administration of the courts because citizens
do not hold them accountable on that issue).
309See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. S5578 (daily ed. May 20, 2005) (statement of Sen.
Comyn) ("A leading Democratic senator has [boasted] of their unprecedented [delaying]
tactics in his fundraising e-mail to Democratic donors.").
3 1 0 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
311 Pickering & Clanton, supra note 29, at 808.
312 STEIGERWALT, supra note 30, at 79-84 (discussing the use of holds on judicial
nominees for reasons other than objections to the affected nomination).
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All of this suggests that senators would be loath to give this up by enacting
the reform proposal. True enough, but the proposal does not actually require
each individual senator to forego these benefits. If a nominee proceeds through
the Confirmation Commission process and receives a positive recommendation
such that her nomination will be consented to absent Senate action, then a
senator is free to lead the charge in passing a disapproval resolution. The
senator could fundraise, motivate base supporters, and ingratiate herself with
interest groups just as successfully. The key difference is that this self-interested
behavior does not lead to the harmful outcome of delayed confirmations and a
resulting judicial vacancy crisis. In fact, this very idea was expressed during the
BRAC debate as one of the proposal's most attractive features. As the Senate
debated the measure, then-Senator Phil Gramm offered the following
observation:
The beauty of this proposal is that, if you have a military base in your
district-God forbid one should be closed in Texas, but it could happen-
under this proposal, I have 60 days. So I come up here and I say, "God have
mercy. Don't close this base in Texas. We can get attacked from the south. The
Russians are going to go after our leadership and you know they are going to
attack Texas. We need this base." Then I can go out and lie down in the street
and the bulldozers are coming and I have a trusty aide there just as it gets there
to drag me out of the way. All the people in Muleshoe, or wherever this base
is, will say, "You know, Phil Gramm got whipped, but it was like the Alamo.
He was with us until the last second. '313
Few judicial confirmations involve bulldozers, but the same dynamic is at
play here-and just as Congress enacted BRAC, thereby giving up much of its
control over the specifics of base closures, the Senate might be just as willing to
do so in the context of consenting to judicial nominations.
Moreover, while senators would be giving up some power in the consenting
side of the judicial appointments process, they would be gaining influence on
the advice side of the equation. The Confirmation Commission mechanism only
kicks in when the President nominates someone from the list provided by the
judicial selection panel created by senators. As such, senators would only see
their consenting power wane when their advice was given more due
consideration.
Speaking of power, it is important to remember that the Senate Judiciary
Committee Chair currently enjoys almost exclusive control over the judicial
confirmation process. 314 The chair decides if and when to take up a nomination,
313 Base Closures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Military Construction of the S.
Comm. on Armed Servs., 99th Cong. 17 (1985) (statement of Sen. Phil Gramm), reprinted in
COLTON C. CAMBELL, DISCHARGING CONGRESS: GOVERNMENT BY COMMISSION 118 (2002).314 Denning, supra note 69, at 33 (arguing that the Senate Judiciary Committee chair
enjoys an "individual veto" over judicial nominations).
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whether to hold hearings, and whether to vote on the nomination.315 And, with
the exception of Supreme Court nominations, the Senate traditionally will not
consider any nomination that fails to receive a favorable recommendation from
the Committee. 316 Thus, it has been said in frustration that the Chair of the
Senate Judiciary Committee exercises a "de facto veto" over all lower court
nominations.317 The proposal might be an attractive alternative to those senators
tired of the near complete control the chair exercises over the confirmation
process. Thus, there may be enough individual incentives to push senators to
adopt the reform proposal.
D. Past Use of Similar Devices
Beyond the incentives-both to each senator and to the chambers as a
whole-that make the proposal's enactment plausible, the individual
components of the proposal also increase the likelihood of its adoption. The
judicial selection panels build off of structures that many senators already rely
on when seeking to influence judicial selection. 318 While it is possible that some
senators will dislike the idea of working with their home state counterpart in
establishing the panels and that there will undoubtedly be some difficulties
arising from the circuit court panels, having a strong, successful history of such
panels to model the idea on should overcome those concerns.
The other two key elements-the Confirmation Commission and
accompanying preferential fast-track procedures-are more controversial. That
said, they, too, enjoy solid roots. Congress has turned to commissions to tackle
any number of matters. 319 Additionally, the Senate Judiciary Committee already
relies on staff, experts, and outside groups to assist in the judicial confirmation
process. 320 Creating a formal commission to conduct the requisite investigations
and make recommendations is not unfathomable. The fast-track procedure, too,
has a long history.321 There are over thirty statutes containing a fast-track
mechanism. 322 This is to say that the individual elements of the proposal are
well known-and for the most part, well-used-in other contexts already.
That said, it is much less common for these mechanisms to be combined
and joined further with the presumption that the Commission's
recommendations will become effective. Indeed, one sees this recusal
3 1 5 BETSY PALMER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RE 31948, EvOLuTION OF THE SENATE'S
ROLE IN THE NOMINATION AND CONFIRMATION PROCESS: A BRIEF HISTORY 4 (2009).3 16 Kmiec & Mincberg, supra note 69, at 235-45 (discussing the current power of the
Senate Judiciary Committee).
3 1 7 Id. at 236.
3 1 8 See supra Part III.B.2-4.
3 1 9 See GLASSMAN & STRAus, supra note 111.
320 EPSTEIN & SEGAL, supra note 31, at 88.
321 Bruhl, supra note 107, at 346 n.9 (providing a list of statutes that include fast-track
procedures).322 Id.
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legislating feature in only the rarest circumstances, as discussed in Part II. But
the BRAC law,32 3 the Rules Enabling Act,324 and the congressional pay
commissions 325 provide valuable support for the idea that when consensus
exists around a specific proposition-here, the need to fill judicial vacancies-
but institutional dynamics prevent action, Congress may be willing to take the
unusual step proposed here. In fact, quite recently, Minority Leader McConnell
proposed such an approach for resolving the stalemate surrounding the nation's
debt limit ceiling.326 As noted above, the Senate certainly recognizes the
problems associated with the current confirmation process and, to date, has not
found an adequate response. As such, it may prove willing to turn to the
features it has used in other contexts to address the confirmation problem.
This is not to say that the Senate's adopting the proposal is assured, or even
likely. There remain plenty of obstacles to its enactment, not least of which is
the perception that senators would be giving up too much power-even if, as
discussed above, that is not the reality. What is real, though, is that interest
groups that have long focused on the judicial confirmation process and have
become accustomed to wielding influence in the process would object.
Additionally, senators who are not interested in the effective administration of
the federal courts may not be affected by the incentives I noted above. And, of
course, the current powerhouse-the Senate Judiciary Committee chair (and
members of the Committee, more generally)-might find the reform hard to
accept. So obstacles to enactment remain and quite real.
But the politics of the situation just as easily suggest that the proposal has a
legitimate chance. There is a compelling case to be made that the moment is
right, that the Senate has grown tired of the "tit for tat" 327 that has marked the
last three presidents' judicial nomination efforts, and that enough senators now
realize that "payback. . . is hell. '328 A change in the judicial confirmation
process would address these concerns.
32310 U.S.C. §2687 note (2006) (originally enacted as Defense Authorization
Amendments and Base Closure and Realignment Act, Pub. L. No. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623
(1988); Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104 Stat.
1808, amended by National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-107, §§ 3001-3007, 115 Stat. 1012, 1342-52).
324 Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)).
325 Federal Security Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-206, 81 Stat. 613, 642-45 (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 351-364 (2006)). The President's Commission on Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial Salaries-which became known as the Quadrennial Commission--
was similar in operation to the BRAC Commission and was Congress's effort at finding a
way of increasing its salary without having to vote itself pay increases. See Teter, supra note
7, at 29-33.326 Jackie Calmes, Debt Talk Mired, Leader for G.O.P. Proposes Option, N.Y. TMES,
July 13, 2011, at Al.
327 Goldman et al., supra note 15, at 288.
328 Binder & Maltzman, supra note 16, at 315 (quoting Sen. Lindsey Graham).
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VII. EXPLAINING THE BENEFITS OF THE PROPOSED REFORMS AND
ANTICIPATING CRITIQUES
The Article has now laid out the confirmation problem, the proposal for
addressing it, and the historical, constitutional, and political justifications for the
suggested reforms. It is time, then, to explain some of the key benefits of the
proposal, as well as to acknowledge a few of the concerns and critiques it will
generate. Here, I hope to move beyond the general formulations that are implicit
in the previous discussions. In other words, it is my assumption the
confirmation process would become more efficient, more likely to yield an
outcome, and would remove some of the bitterness currently associated with the
judicial confirmations. But how does that translate into other worthwhile
benefits? The purpose of this Part is to shed some light on these advantages and
to respond to a few anticipated critiques of the proposal.
A. Returning the Focus of Judicial Selection to Qualifications
The current judicial confirmation process "turns on personalities" as much
as anything else.329 According to Michael Gerhardt, the factors most affecting a
nomination's success include the candidate's personality and political views,
the opposition party's strength, how the administration manages the
confirmation, and the degree of interest group involvement.330 In their study of
the judicial confirmation process, Sarah Binder and Forrest Maltzman found
that the most significant causes of delays and obstruction were the ideological
distance between the President and the opposing party, divided government, and
if the nomination occurred in a presidential election year.331 One thing that
seems to have little effect on the nominee's consideration is her
qualifications. 332 And yet, the merit of the nomination is what senators say they
should focus on333 and, as Part IV's account of the Appointments Clause history
showed, was what the Framers wanted the Senate to be concerned with.334
Through the proposal, the Senate can spell out the criteria for the Selection
Panels and Commission to consider as they recommend and investigate
nominees. And, perhaps, once the Commission has determined that a nominee
deserves appointment, those senators who oppose the individual for reasons
other than merit will find it more difficult to bitterly protest the candidate by
calling her credentials into question. In any event, the Commission's decision
and report will return the focus to the nominee's qualifications.
329 Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., Advice and Consent: The Role of the United
States Senate in the Judicial Selection Process, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 200, 203 (1987).
330 Gerhardt, supra note 14, at 514-19.
331 Binder & Maltzman, supra note 16, at 308-14.
332 Id.
333 See generally Should Ideology Matter?, supra note 27.
334 See supra notes 128-51 and accompanying text.
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B. Reducing Politics'Influence on the Judiciary
An overly partisan and ideological judicial confirmation process threatens
to inject such politics into the judiciary. More concretely, as debates over
nominations turn into partisan battles, the consequence is that the legitimacy of
the courts is called into question.335 Confirmation fights over the Sixth Circuit
illustrate the problem. In the late 1990s, the Sixth Circuit was fairly evenly split
between Democratic and Republican appointees, but also saw a vacancy rate of
25%.336 To preserve the partisan balance, Michigan's one Republican senator
blocked President Clinton's nominees through the use of the blue slip policy
followed by then-Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Orrin Hatch.337 Then,
after the 2000 elections, Michigan's two Democratic senators successfully
objected to President Bush's nominations to the Sixth Circuit. 338 The impasse
lasted for a decade. 339 Scholars speculate that such "pronounced conflict over
potential judges lessens public confidence in the courts." 340 Moreover, there is
evidence that as the Senate obstructs, the public sees the debate as more about
"politics" than "principle." 341 The blurring of the lines between partisan politics
and the federal judiciary may ultimately affect public confidence in judges.
By returning the focus of the judicial confirmation process to the nominees'
qualifications and by creating a mechanism that is less likely to lead to as many
protracted fights, the proposal may restore some of the faith that Americans
place in the judiciary as being above the partisan fray.
C. Improving Overall Senate Functioning
The confirmation mess, with its partisanship, delays, obstructionism, and
retribution, has consequences far beyond the Senate's handling of judicial
nominations. It has affected the Senate's other business. The nomination fights
of 2003-2005, for example, "frayed the Senate's already wafer-thin veneer of
comity. 342 In a chamber that operates by unanimous consent agreements
343
and, historically at least, through collegiality, 344 divisive confirmation battles
can create lasting collateral damage.
3 3 5 BINDER & MALTZMAN, supra note 9, at 136-42.
336 Binder & Maltzman, supra note 16, at 302.
337Id. at 308.3381 d
339Press Release, Sen. Patrick Leahy, Leahy Helps Solve Impasse on Sixth Circuit
Nominations (Apr. 15, 2008), available at http://www.leahy.senate.gov/press/press-releases/
release/?id=947918c9-d78a-4746-83 lb-f99c9a9a9bcO.
340 Binder & Maltzman, supra note 16, at 315.
341 Id.
342Id.
3 4 3 See OLESZEK, supra note 66, at 203-12.
344See Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 67, at 194.
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Additionally, the Senate is already strained with an ever-increasing
workload and the need to deal with delays and obstruction in the legislative
arena.345 The time devoted to engaging in dilatory tactics or debating which
party has been more obstructionist in its treatment of judicial nominees could be
better spent on more substantial matters. To make things more difficult, the
Senate Judiciary Committee itself is "structured primarily for the consideration
of legislation," 346 not for the work associated with conducting detailed judicial
confirmation investigations.
The proposal could go a long way in helping the Senate function. Removing
one of the primary sources of vitriol is a start, as is removing the task of
scrutinizing judicial nominees, as it will mean the Senate can focus on other
concerns-whether it chooses to or not is another question.
D. Aiding Judicial Administration
Perhaps the most concrete benefit of the proposal is that it will aid judicial
functioning. In a 2007 study assessing the performance of the twelve circuit
courts of appeal, analysts found that the "longer more judgeships remained
vacant on a circuit, the longer it took for the court to act on its docket."'347
Unfortunately, as noted earlier, a well-functioning court system is not a salient
electoral issue.348 Senators are not rewarded or punished based on an
overcrowded district court docket or the amount of time it takes for a court of
appeals to issue an opinion. The lack of political incentive for an efficient
federal judiciary means that one of the clearest consequences of the current
confirmation system is relatively unimportant to senators.
The proposal's chief objective is to end the obstructionism and delays
associated with the judicial confirmation process and to return the focus to
considerations of the nominees' qualifications. This should help reduce the
current vacancy rate. Additionally, there is strong anecdotal evidence to suggest
that qualified candidates have been so turned off by the current appointment
process that they forego nomination. Judicial functioning will improve,
therefore, not only because the judiciary will be operating at higher capacity,
but also because the number of qualified candidates interested in appointment
will increase.
3 45 See Rsumg of Congressional Activity, U.S. SENATE, http://www.senate.gov/page
layout/reference/twocolumntable/Resumes.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (increased
number of votes per session); Senate Action on Cloture Motions, U.S. SENATE,
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/cloturemotions/clotureCounts.htm (last visited
Apr. 10, 2012) (increased number of cloture votes per session).
3 46 Mathias, supra note 329, at 205.
347 Binder & Maltzman, supra note 16, at 314.
348 See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
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E. Greater Comparative Benefits
As discussed in Part III, the confirmation mess has inspired proposed fixes
from presidents, 349 legislators, 350 scholars,351 and even failed nominees. 352 The
common element of most of those proposals is to create a timeframe by which
the Senate must act on a nomination.353 Some also include an element
promoting greater Senate involvement in advising on possible judicial
selections,354 while others simply seek to remove the threat of filibusters and
holds with judicial nominations. 355 Each of these proposals would provide some
aid to the cause of a more efficient judicial confirmation process. But, in many
respects, the changing dynamics of the Senate would ultimately render them
ineffective. The delays and obstructionism associated with judicial nominations
are no longer just the work of individual senators exercising their own
prerogatives. Instead, as Democrats showed in 2003 to 2005 and Republicans
are proving today, blocking judicial nominations is now a part of the partisan
strategies of Senate leaders. We have reached the point where modest changes
around the periphery will not suffice. Like the military base closure problem in
the 1980s, congressional structures, institutional norms, and electoral
constraints make it nearly impossible for the Senate to diligently fulfill its
advice and consent responsibilities in the way it has in the past. The proposal
offers a comprehensive fix-one that allows the Senate to maintain its current
role in consenting to judicial nominations when it can, but that creates an
alternative path to Senate confirmation for nominees when the system is not
functioning as it should.
F. Responding to Anticipated Critiques
The proposal will undoubtedly generate criticisms that deserve attention
when assessing its viability.
The first critique to contend with is that the proposal would upset the
carefully constructed balance of power between the President and the Senate
regarding judicial appointments. Those commentators who have suggested that
the Senate play a larger role in the advice and consent process will likely be
aghast at the notion of relying on a Confirmation Commission to investigate and
recommend confirmation. Unlike many other ideas floated to address the
confirmation mess, however, this proposal achieves its end by increasing the
Senate's role in the advisory stage of the appointment process. Only if the
349 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
350Id.
3 5 1 Id.
35 2 Pickering & Clanton, supra note 29.
353 See, e.g., S. Res. 327, 108th Cong. (2004); Bush, supra note 69.
354See, e.g., Gorjanc, supra note 69; Reynolds, supra note 69; Strauss & Sunstein,
supra note 70.
355 See, e.g., Comyn, supra note 69; Denning, supra note 69.
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President heeds the Senate's advice would the chamber's consent responsibility
be reduced. In other words, the only time the President would see an increase in
power is when it is balanced by an increase in power for the Senate elsewhere in
the appointment process. As such, the criticism that the proposal gives the
President too much influence at the expense of the Senate is simply untrue.
A related critique is that the proposal alters the role that the Framers
envisioned for the Senate. As Part IV's account of the history of the
Appointments Clause shows, however, the Framers never discussed the process
through which the Senate should advise and consent to nominations. 356 Instead,
the delegates at the Constitutional Convention focused on the objectives of the
process-ensuring that qualified judges filled the judiciary rather than those
appointed for personal or political reasons. 357 The Senate was to serve as a
check on the President's ability to appoint judges out of personal favoritism or
loyalty.358 The proposal still allows the Senate to fulfill this end by having the
chamber establish the criteria the Confirmation Commission is to consider when
assessing a nominee. Moreover, in those instances where personal favoritism is
at its greatest risk-when the President nominates someone not recommended
by the Selection Panel-the proposal's Confirmation Commission mechanism
is not even implicated. As such, the Senate's intended role is preserved and the
Framers' objectives are met.
Of course, like most delegations of authority, the proposal will also raise
concerns about the Senate abdicating its responsibility and subverting
accountability. 359 On the first point, the argument goes that senators have an
obligation to advise and consent to nominations, and by creating a presumption
that the Confirmation Commission's recommendations will take effect, the
Senate is not living up to its duty. This concern loses much of its force,
however, for several reasons. As noted above, the chief purpose in including the
Senate in the appointments process was to serve as "security" against a
President using the nomination power to reward friends.360 The Commission
process allows the Senate to continue to fulfill this role-perhaps even better
than the current process permits. Additionally, unlike delegations in the
legislative context, the Senate is not leaving to an agency in a different branch
the responsibility of creating public policy. It is not, in other words,
"undermin[ing] the democratic principle of our governing system by taking
policymaking out of the hands of democratically elected representatives and
placing it in the hands of an unelected few." 361 Instead, the Senate is creating an
advisory board to help it fulfill its advice and consent obligations. But no matter
what the Commission recommends, it is still acting on the criteria established
356 See supra notes 150-57 and accompanying text.
357 See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
358 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
359 See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATIONS (1993).
360 2 RECORDS, supra note 135, at 43.
361 Teter, supra note 7, at 43.
[Vol. 73:2
RETHINKING CONSENT
by the Senate, the Senate can still act to disapprove the Commission's
recommendations, and it is, ultimately, still the Senate consenting to the
nomination by forwarding the confirmation to the President. In short, there
really is no delegation about which to complain.
Nevertheless, the accountability concern deserves attention, too. After all,
one of the benefits of the proposal is that it would help take many of the
electoral considerations out of the judicial confirmation process. This is an
implicit-maybe even explicit-acknowledgement that citizens will be less able
to hold senators accountable for how judicial nominations proceed. Doesn't this
allow senators to hide behind unelected members of the Commission, thereby
"shortcircuit[ing]" 362 accountability? Perhaps, but not likely. First, there is little
to suggest that voters seek to hold senators accountable for their votes on lower
court nominations.363 To the extent that electoral considerations lead to
obstructionism, it is not as an appeal to the majority of voters in a senator's state
as much as it is to incite base supporters, curry favor with interest groups, or
raise money.364 Reducing a senator's accountability to these interests is a
positive outcome, not a cause for concern. But more to the point, it is not
necessarily true that senators should be directly accountable to voters in the
realm of judicial confirmations. Indeed, the Framers certainly did not think so.
After all, in the original constitutional scheme, senators were appointed by state
legislatures, who in turn were directly elected by voters. In other words, the
Framers rested the advice and consent function with a small body of individug's
who were not themselves directly accountable to the people, but who were
appointed by those who were. The proposal, with the creation of a Confirmation
Commission whose members are appointed by senators now directly
accountable to the people, actually restores the original relationship between
citizens and the advice and consent function of the Appointments Clause.
Finally, discussions of accountability too often view the concern through
the single lens of holding representatives accountable for action, without any
consideration of the difficulty of holding senators responsible for inaction and
delay. In the context of judicial confirmations, of course, inaction is the
problem-one that is unlikely to receive the voters' attention. The proposal
recognizes this and maintains the same level of accountability that voters enjoy
over the confirmation process. It simply reverses the direction of the pressures
in the system so that senators can be held responsible for inaction as easily as
they can for action.
In the end, then, the benefits of the proposal far outweigh the associated
costs. Given the real problems caused by the delays and obstructionism endemic
to the current confirmation process, it is past time for the Senate to give serious
consideration to the reforms proposed here.
362 SCHOENBROD, supra note 359, at 14.
363 See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
364See supra notes 309-11 and accompanying text.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Broad consensus exists that the judicial confirmation process is broken.
Democrats, Republicans, senators, presidents, judges, legal scholars, journalists,
and, of course, nominees have all expressed frustration with the current system.
Past proposals to modify the confirmation process, though, have gone nowhere.
Does that mean that nothing can be done? Hardly. Sometimes, proposed
reforms fail to gain traction because they are not comprehensive-they do not
strike at the roots of the problem. They do not reform.
The proposals put forward here do not suffer from that defect-perhaps just
the opposite. The notion of the Senate creating a Confirmation Commission and
a binding fast-track mechanism for judicial confirmations may seem too radical.
But the flaws in the current confirmation process have become so entrenched
that they are now part of the Senate's norms. Reshaping those institutional
behaviors and expectations requires dramatic changes. The judicial
confirmation reforms offered here would get the process moving again so that
the Senate can meet its constitutional responsibility to advise and consent.
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